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1 Introduction1
Income inequalities have become again the focus of many debates in economics as revived by the
work of Piketty (2013) and coauthors on the brutal increase of top incomes in the last 50 years
in most countries. More contrasted is the evidence on earnings inequalities at the country level,
across developed countries (Atkinson and Morelli, 2014) or at the world level (Milanovic, 2016).
Fewer studies look at the building up of inequalities over the life-cycle (Lagakos, Moll, Porzio,
Qian and Shoellman, 2018) although this is an important component of wage inequalities.
Many competing theories account for the shape of wage proles over the life-cycle. Invest-
ments in human capital, learning by doing or job search are the most popular (Rubinstein and
Weiss, 2006). It is di¢ cult, however, to test them apart, in particular when empirical researchers
allow parameters governing these models to be individual specic. These theories are helpful in
disciplining the specication of wage proles and the interpretation of empirical results, when
estimating models of wage proles and by consequence, life-cycle inequalities.
In this paper, we use a human capital investment setup à la Ben Porath (1967), as developed
in Magnac, Pistolesi and Roux (2018), to specify wage proles. Analyzing wages, and not
earnings, allows to abstract from labor supply issues and to remain closer to the skill-building
view of human capital. In the empirical application proposed here, we use French administrative
data on wage proles of a single large cohort of around 7500 male workers, entering the labour
market in 1977, and followed until 2007. Focusing on a single cohort allows to concentrate on
life cycle issues, since France is one of the countries in which earnings inequality was stable over
these years (Atkinson and Morelli, 2014) at the population level at least, in contrast with top
incomes. We show that the cohort under study has no specicities and we control for aggregate
e¤ects using a at spot approach (Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998, Bowlus and Robinson,
2012).
Our theoretical set-up leads to an empirical factor model in which an individual wage prole
are described by three individual-specic parameters, a level, a slope and a curvature. The slope
is expected to be positive, and the curvature negative, since proles are generally increasing and
concave. Pervasive heterogeneity is simpler to deal with, in this linear framework, than in non-
linear ones (e.g. Browning, Ejrnaes and Alvarez, 2012, Polachek, Das and Thamma-Apiroam,
1We thank Christian Belzil, Richard Blundell, Laurent Gobillon, Jim Heckman, Nicolas Pistolesi and Bernard
Salanié for helpful comments as well as participants in numerous seminars where we presented earlier versions
of this research This research has received nancial support from the European Research Council under the
European Communitys Seventh Framework Program FP7/2007-2013 grant agreement N295298 and funding
from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements dAvenir program). All errors remain ours.
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2015). For the remaining individual-and-time shocks, we t a general ARMA specication and
do not take a stand on how this would be decomposed into persistent and transitory components
since consumption data are not available and the decomposition cannot be identied (Ejrnæs &
Browning, 2014).
Our rst contribution is to decompose wage proles in aggregate e¤ects due to groups of
skills (age at entry and initial skill occupation) and unobserved individual e¤ects due to specic
human capital investments. In contrast with the US (Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998), we
nd that between and within group covariances are very similar.
Our second contribution is to propose a sequential estimation method by random e¤ects,
rst, and xed e¤ects, second. There are good econometric reasons for estimating by random
e¤ect methods the global characteristics of wage proles (Alvarez & Arellano, 2004) and this
might explain why estimates using covariance matrices of log wages and minimum distance might
yield di¤erent results (Hryshko, 2012). A random e¤ect method deals with (i) issues of initial
conditions, quite out of the stationary path in the case of wages, delivers (ii) an estimate of serial
correlation at the population level and provides (iii) an estimate of the covariance of individual
e¤ects. As a consequence of these three arguments, random e¤ects discipline the estimation of
xed e¤ects. Random e¤ects however do not deliver other moments than the variance of the
distribution of individual e¤ects, while xed e¤ects do at the price of a 1=T bias which can be
bias-corrected (Arellano and Bonhomme, 2012).
Our third set of contributions is empirical. First, we nd that the variance of the long-run
value of a wage prole, as accounted by discounted sums of log-wages over the (observed) life-
cycle, is about the same as the cross-section variance of log wages after 5 years of the life-cycle
but only 60%, after 30 years. This is in line with estimates of Bonke, Cormeo and Lutken (2014)
using German data in which they nd that the former is about 2/3 of the latter. Second, we
nd that heterogeneity explains 70% of the variance at the beginning of the life-cycle and 90%
after 30 years which is in line with Keane and Wolpin (1997) but larger than what is obtained
by Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011) or Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2014) in
admittedly less heterogeneous set-ups. Third, we nd that the relative explanatory power of
observed skills and unobserved individual heterogeneity changes over the life-cycle, from half
and half after ve years in the labor market, to a 30-70% decomposition after 30 years. The
persistence of observed heterogeneity is more noticeable though in the long run since observed
heterogeneity account for more than 50 percent of the long run inequality. Fourth, a single
dimension heterogeneity term does not describe well the variance of log wages in cross sections.
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The xed individual e¤ect in level explains well the variance at the beginning of the life cycle
but not at the end. In contrast, the individual slope and curvature of proles explain well the
variance at the end of the life cycle but not at the beginning.
This is why inequality in the long run cannot be explained by a single heterogeneity com-
ponent but the three (levels, slope and curvature) are needed and in particular, for the high skill
group. We also show that returns are correlated negatively with the initial wage level, purged
from transient e¤ects, as in Gladden and Taber (2009) or Sorensen and Vejlin (2014) but this
result is not uniform over the life-cycle. This is only the case over the 20 rst years of the
life-cycle, this correlation turning positive afterwards, because of the heterogeneous curvature of
the wage proles. Allowing for an horizon e¤ect, that the curvature of the prole picks out, is
an innovation in this literature and seems to be key in these impacts.
Literature review It is useful to start with a brief comparison with the extensive empirical
literature on earnings dynamics (see Meghir and Pistaferri, 2010, for a review). An important
part of this literature aims at tting the empirical covariance structure of (log) earnings over the
life-cycle using competing specications like the one described as heterogeneous income proles
(HIP) or restricted income proles (RIP). Up to now, there is no consensus in the literature
about which specication ts the data best (see e.g. Baker, 1997, Guvenen, 2007, Hryshko, 2012
and Ho¤mann, 2019). Our linear factor structure embeds both models since the permanent
component includes individual specic levels and growth rates of earnings as HIP does and
the stochastic component can be any mixture of permanent and transitory shocks like in RIP.
Nonetheless, our three factor structure invalidates the key identifying assumption about the
correlations between rst di¤erences of within shocks (for instance Blundell, 2014) because of
the presence of the curvature term.
Our paper also touches the estimation of the traditional homogeneous wage equation (Mincer,
1974). The state-of-the-art study is Lagakos et al. (2018) which studies an impressive set of
countries and shows that experience-wage proles are twice as steep in rich countries as in poor
countries. Furthermore, more educated workers have steeper proles. What we observe in our
administrative data is similar although other studies (Engbom, 2017), using survey data (EHCP
and SILC), nds that wage growth in France is relatively small among 12 OECD countries (same
as in Germany but less than in the US and the UK).
There has been recently some non-linear alternative proposals to the previous literature such
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as Browning et al. (2012), Hospido (2012), Song, Price, Guvenen, Bloom, and Von Wachter
(2018) or Bonhomme and Robin (2009) and Pora and Wilner (2017) using French data. There
are also semiparametric analyses such as Lochner and Shin (2014) and Arellano, Blundell and
Bonhomme (2018) using US data which have di¤erent characteristics from the data we use
since the returns to observable components increased dramatically in the US (Autor, Katz and
Kearney, 2008). It is generally di¢ cult to compare these non linear estimations with ours
because our linear model is designed to capture means and covariances, while using pervasive
heterogeneity. The bridge between those methods could be the generalization of our procedures
to the estimation of quantiles.
In a di¤erent vein, there is a more economically oriented literature trying to distinguish
theories of wage growth, namely, human capital, job search or learning by doing. Rubinstein
and Weiss (2006) takes stock of the literature before the 2000, and distinguishes job search
and human capital theories by some of their predictions. Job search models predict a negative
correlation between wage and subsequent wage growth over the life-cycle, while human capital
models predicts that it is negative at the beginning of the life cycle but turns positive afterwards.
The latter is what we nd in our empirical analysis. Some recent literature models explicitly job
search, in contrast with this paper in which we treat job search as a transient residual cause.
Bowlus & Liu (2013) decomposes earnings growth into human capital (50%), job search (20%),
the rest being their interaction. In contrast, Bagger et al. (2014) nds that job search, or "job-
shopping", signicantly contributes to wage growth but seems to be mostly occurring over the
rst ten years of the working life. Furthermore, Burdett, Carrillo-Tudela and Coles (2016) nds
that most of the e¤ect of experience on wages is due to passive learning-by-doing.
Contratsing human capital investments and learning by doing is the objective of fewer papers.
Heckman, Lochner and Cossa (2003) show that distinguishing job training and learning by doing
might use that wage subsidies, such as EITC, provide additional incentives to work, enhance
learning by doing and decrease investments in human capital. Belley (2017) contends that
learning by doing does not seem prevalent since it does not predict the trade-o¤ between current
and future earnings, observed in the data and a prediction of human capital models. Blandin
(2018) also points out that learning by doing does not predict a decrease in investments at the
end of the working life.
Finally, within the human capital paradigm, Sanders and Taber (2011) reviews models with
multidimensional human capital. Sorensen and Vejlin (2014) estimates the correlation between
initial wages and later wage growth as well as its non parametric equivalent using Danish data
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over 20 years. They, as well as Gladden and Taber (2009), nd that this correlation is negative.
We nd the same negative correlation over the rst 20 years but it turns positive afterwards.
Our approach di¤ers from theirs in two aspects. First, we have a 3-factor linear model in which
the horizon e¤ect is key. Second, these authors use the observed initial wage, which is transient
at this age, while we try to lter out these transient initial conditions. We use the reconstructed
non-transient initial log-wage by using a combination of random and xed e¤ects.
Section 2 briey describes the evolution of earnings inequality in France and the data we
use. Section 3 details our empirical strategy and Section 4 the econometric methods. Section 5
reports estimation results and Section 6 gathers the results of various decompositions of life-cycle
inequalities.
2 A Brief Description of the Data
We briey summarize the evolution of wage inequality in France over the last 40 years and
present stylized facts about means, variances and autocorrelations of log wages in our sample,
after reporting how we constructed this sample from administrative sources.
2.1 Earnings and Wage Inequality in France
The sharp increase in earnings inequality in the UK and in the US over the last thirty years
is a well known empirical fact (see for example Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008, or Mo¢ tt and
Gottschalk, 2011, for the US and Blundell & Etheridge, 2010, for the UK). Yet, the picture is
more balanced in other OECD countries and while some European countries have experienced
an increasing dispersion in earnings, others have not been a¤ected by this trend and have had
stable or decreasing dispersion. Atkinson and Morelli (2014) compute international earnings
inequality comparisons over the second half, or so, of the twentieth century for 25 countries. As
regards European economies, they conclude that earnings inequality has increased in Germany,
Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland while in Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Spain earnings dispersion has stayed constant or decreased over this period.
In France, earnings inequality in 2010 is broadly comparable to its level in the sixties and
if anything has decreased. Atkinson and Morelli (2014) report an unchanged Gini coe¢ cient
for earnings over the period. Using Labour Force Surveys (LFS), they also compute yearly
measures of inequality and show a very stable inequality level. Using two di¤erent datasets,
the DADS, used here, and the French LFS, Verdugo (2014) concludes that the two data sets
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provide strikingly similar gures of constant or decreasing earnings dispersion between 1964
and 2005. Verdugo (2014) decomposes the total earnings dispersion into upper and lower-tail
earnings inequality. The dispersion at the top of the distribution remained constant, since the
P90/P50 index in earnings uctuates around 2, while the dispersion at the bottom measured
by the P50/P10 index decreased from 1.9 to 1.5. Charnoz, Coudin and Gaini (2011) also use
the DADS data to reach the same conclusion that earnings inequality in France has been rather
stable from 1976 to 1992 and has been slightly decreasing from 1995 to 2004. This stability has
been attributed, at least partly, to a strong policy driven increase in education at the end of the
1980s and labor market policy regulations at the end of the 1990s (Charnoz, Coudin and Gaini,
2014).
A note of caution is in order. While these studies consider changes in the cross-sectional
earnings distributions, changes in the structure of the population that play an important role in
the previous studies, are neutralized here. We follow a single cohort of individuals entering the
labor market in 1977 to focus on inequalities unraveling over the life-cycle.
2.2 Our Working Sample
Our panel dataset on wages is extracted from a French administrative source named Déclarations
Annuelles de Données Sociales (DADS) which has been used for employee-employer studies as
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999).2 DADS data is collected through a mandatory data
requirement for social security and tax verication purposes. All employers must send to the
social security and tax administrations the list of all persons who have been employed in their
establishments during the year. Firms report the full earnings they have paid to every employee
and payments exclude other labor costs borne by the rm. Each person is identied by a unique
individual social security number which facilitates the follow-up of individuals through time
although we cannot reconstruct taxes they pay. The tax system is household-based in France
and the linking of this dataset with scal records is not authorized yet.
The French National Statistical Institute (INSEE) has been drawing, since 1976, a sample
from this dataset at a sampling rate of around 4% by retaining all individuals who were born in
October of even years. Using administrative data is an important advantage since these data are
less subject to attrition or measurement errors. Unlike survey data, the collection of information
2These data are accessible through securitized access (CASD). Other contributions in the earnings literature
that use administrative data is Ho¤mann (2019) and Daly, Hryshko and Manovskii (2016) (German and Danish
data).
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does not rely on individual response behavior and individuals are better followed over time.
Moreover, the large sample size enables us to use a single large cohort of individuals who entered
the labor market in the same year.
This dataset is restricted to individuals employed in the private sector or in publicly-owned
companies and we consider only males to lessen selection issues. Observations can yet be missing
for di¤erent reasons. Data were not collected in three years (1981, 1983 and 1990) for reasons
specic to INSEE. It is also quite frequent that employees exit the panel and a signicant fraction
of those reenter it after a few years (see Table S.i in the Supplementary Appendix). Those
absences might stand for spells in the public sector, as self-employed, or out-of-employment. We
also code as missing part-time employment in any given year.
We restrict our analysis to labor market entrants in 1977, a set that we call "cohort" in the
following, even if their age is heterogenous. Entrants are dened as those who started working
full time for more than 6 months in 1977, and are still employed the following year, possibly in a
di¤erent rm. To make sure that these employees have a permanent attachment to the private
sector and to mitigate the issue of missing years in 1981 and 1983, we keep only those who also
work in 1982 and 1984 and who were aged between 16 and 30 in 1977. The distribution functions
of unobserved factor loadings, or idiosyncratic components, that we estimate in the following
refer to this subpopulation. Moreover, lacking a credible identication strategy to correct for
selection, we shall assume that missingness is at random.
We dene wages as the sum of all earnings during a year, divided by the number of days
worked. This allows employees to have within-year periods out of the private sector. Short-
comings of administrative data are that other components of income, including other sources
of earnings, are missing and that few observable characteristics are available, apart from age at
labor market entry and the skill level of the rst job.
First, it is likely that workers delaying entry have a higher education level than the ones
who entered earlier. Second, initial skills are grouped into three categories based on a two-digit
codication: high-skill (managers, professionals), medium-skill (blue-collar or white-collar skilled
workers) and low-skill jobs. Our 20 resulting "education" groups are dened by the interaction
between these two variables when groups are not too small (see e.g. Table 2 for the denition
and size of each group). Since education is dened according to characteristics recorded at labor
market entry, individuals are attached to the same education group during their whole working
life.
Other details completing this description can be found in Data Appendix A.
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2.3 Wage dynamics: a single cohort
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the composition of the sample over time. The sample
size is 7446 observations in 1977 and 4670 in 2007. Human capital groups dened above are
of unequal size, the groups with an early age of entry being the largest ones, and with a late
age of entry, the smallest. Attrition follows a somewhat irregular pattern due in part to the
original data and to our sampling design (see Supplementary Appendix, Table S.i). There are
also more surprising features for instance in 1994 (or 2003 at a lesser degree) a year in which
many observations are missing. This is due to the way INSEE reconstructed the data from the
information in the original les.
We report in Figure 1, the evolution of average log-wages over the life cycle, in 2007-euros,
for three age of entry groups (< 20,  20 and  24 and > 24) and these proles display the
familiar increasing and concave shape.
By taking deviations of (log) wages with respect to their means in the groups dened by age
of entry, skills and years, we compute log-wage residuals. The left panel of Figure 2 plots the
change in the cross-sectional variance of those (log) wage residuals for the full sample, while the
right panel graphs the variance by age of entry groups. Choosing the variance as a description of
the process is adapted to the random e¤ect specication that we estimate. Using other inequality
measures (Gini , Theil or Atkinson) does not change the qualitative features of our descriptions.
The rst few years witness a strong variability of wages. Until the sixth year of observation,
1982 (respectively the fourth, 1980), the variance of log wages drops for the low skill groups
(resp. for the other groups) whereas it increases gradually over the rest of the sample period
till around 1995. The variance prole is at afterwards in contrast to the US where it continues
to grow (e.g. Rubinstein and Weiss, 2006, using PSID). From the right panel one can notice
that late entrants in the labor market experience higher levels and larger rates of growth for the
variance of log-wages over the life-cycle as in most countries (Lagakos et al, 2018).
The covariance matrix of log-wage residuals is reported in the Supplementary Appendix Table
S.ii although this is easier to use graphs to describe the main features of wage autocorrelations.
Figure 3 displays the autocorrelation of residuals of log wages in year t with residuals in an early
(resp. late) year, 1986 (resp. 2007). This Figure reveals an asymmetric pattern over time which
is quite robust to the choice of these specic years (1986 and 2007). The correlation between
wages in year t and in 1986 is swiftly increasing when t is before 1986 and this is also true for
2007 albeit at a lesser degree. In contrast, the correlation between wages in 1986 and in year t is
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only slowly decaying in t, if time t postdates 1986. Figure 4 takes a di¤erent view that conrms
the previous diagnostic by plotting the autocorrelations of order 1 and 6. Note that their shape
are very similar and increase uniformly over time although at di¤erent levels. The closer to the
end of the working life, the larger the autocorrelation coe¢ cients are.3 This provides strong
evidence that wages are becoming more stable as employees progress in their life-cycle.
3 Empirical strategy
We specify a linear factor model of wage dynamics. Our starting point is the model of human
capital investments after leaving school that is developed in Magnac et al. (2018) and that
provides exact theoretical foundations à la Ben Porath (1967), for a Mincer (1974) reduced form
wage equation at the individual level. This specication is more tractable to estimate, than
alternatives when heterogeneity is pervasive (Browning, Ejrnæs and Alvarez, 2012, Polachek et
al., 2015). Magnac et al. (2018) spell out the conditions under which the (log) wage equation
can be written as a linear factor model where the three observed factors are ft =
 
1; t;  t

:
lnwit = i1 + i2t+ i3
 t + vit; (1)
in which  < 1 is the assumed homogenous discount factor. This reduced form delivers the
familiar increasing and concave shape when i2 > 0 and i3 < 0.
When wages are appropriately discounted, as in the at spot approach that we describe
below, the rst three terms measure the logarithm of the current human capital stock (net of
current investments) while vit can be interpreted as the logarithm of the price of human capital,
net of accumulated depreciations. Implicitly, the inuence of job search, the job ladder, or
dismissals, are hidden in the latter component.
Factor loadings or individual specic e¤ects i1, i2 and i3 have a structural interpretation.
The rst two ones are related respectively to the initial level of human capital i.e. the ability
to earn (see Browning et al., 1999) and to the rate of return to investments i.e. the ability to
learn. Furthermore, the ratio between i3 and i2, i.e. the ratio of the "curvature" relative to
the growth of log wages, can be structurally interpreted as the value given to human capital at
an arbitrary terminal period. The longer the horizon of investment, the smaller the curvature
(Lillard and Reville, 1999). Note that this model nests the Heterogenous Income Prole (HIP)
3In the Supplementary Appendix, graph S.ii dispalys that this cohort has nothing specic when compared to
younger cohorts entering later into the labor market
10
and the Restricted Income Prole (RIP) as in Guvenen (2007) since vit can be any time-series
process.
Estimating this very heterogenous reduced form leads to the decomposition of the wage
prole heterogeneity in each of its structural components. Deriving the relative importance
of each component is the object of Section 6 which extends to an heterogeneous setting, the
calibration exercise of Huggett et al. (2011) using US data.
Before that, the rst step of our empirical strategy decomposes the net log price of human
capital, vit; into aggregate and individual specic components. Aggregate components are con-
structed using the subsamples dened by the education groups that we constructed before, from
skill and age at labor market entry. They can be interpreted as market (log) prices net of de-
preciation for education "types" when we adopt the framework of Heckman et al. (1998), in
which human capital stocks of di¤erent education groups are imperfect substitutes in the aggreg-
ate production function. In contrast, perfect substitution holds within groups, and individual
specic shocks are interpreted as frictions.
The mechanisms that underlie the specic dynamics of aggregate and individual specic
components are allowed to di¤er, and are left unrelated. In consequence, we handle education
group and individual specic e¤ects separately and recompose them afterwards to recover the
full e¤ects.
3.1 Aggregate components
Equation (1) can be linearly aggregated, in each education group, as:
ln ygt = g1 + g2t+ g3
 t + vgt; (2)
in which g denotes a group dened by skill and age of entry and gk = E(ik j i 2 g) for k = 1; 2
or 3, vgt = E(vit j i 2 g). The term vgt stands for the market log-prices of human capital of
group g at time t:
Aggregate log prices are given by :
E(vgt j ft =
 
1; t;  t

) = 'gt; (3)
in which 'gt is an estimable series. Condition (3) requires that the net log price dynamics is
driven by factors orthogonal to the ones which govern average human capital accumulation and
is the key restriction that separates quantities from prices. To identify 'gt (up to a constant
term), Heckman et al. (1998) and Bowlus and Robinson (2012) use a "at spot" condition by
11
which (2) is satised with g2t + g3
 t ' 0 for a restricted window of periods close to the end
of the working life (around 50). This means that investments and depreciation shocks exactly
balance each other at those ages. This is a structural way of solving the well known impossibility
of separately identifying age, cohort and time e¤ects in a linear setting. We apply this at spot
technique and assess robustness of our results by using various wage or productivity deators as
estimates of 'gt. The stability of the between and within group wage inequality in France over
this period supports the credibility of assumption (3).
3.2 Individual specic components
Turning to within group variation, dene centered individual e¤ects as their deviations with
respect to their means, cik = ik   gk, for k = 1, 2, or 3 and vcit = vit   vg(i)t. Centering the log
wage equation (1) yields log-wage residuals:
uit = ln yit   ln yg(i)t = ci1 + ci2t+ ci3 t + vcit; (4)
in which uit is the deviation of individual log-wages with respect to their group averages. In-
dividual specic deviations, vcit, stand for frictions in a model of search and mobility (see e.g.
Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2010). The dynamics of the wage process is indeed partly bounded
from below and from above by two processes which are individual productivity in the current
match and outside o¤ers that the agent receives while on the job. At times, bounds are binding
and wages are: Either equal to the productivity process because adverse shocks on that process
make employee and employer renegociate the wage contract. Or equal to the outside o¤er in
the case the employee can either renegociate with his employer or take the outside o¤er if the
productivity is lower that the outside option.
These frictions are here described by a stochastic process which is mean independent of
factors and factor loadings:4
E(vcit j ft =
 
1; t;  t

; ci) = 0: (5)
Note that it lets other moments of vcit depend freely on factors and individual e¤ects 
c
i . The
mean independence of frictions, vit, with respect to factors, ft, and individual e¤ects, ci , is the
main assumption underpinning the identication of individual-specic structural parameters.
4We slightly relax the assumption of mean independence of frictions with respect to individual e¤ects by
authorizing general initial conditions in the random e¤ect model that we estimate, in the empirical application
below.
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The issue of missing data is potentially important in our empirical application since we
observe wages if and only if individuals are employed by the private sector. Missingness could
be due to periods spent in the public sector, as self-employed or as non employed. Absent
credible instruments or structural assumptions, we assume in the following that missingness is
at random. The existence of missing data becomes unconsequential for consistently estimating
aggregate e¤ects while we show below that the random e¤ect likelihood approach we adopt,
deals with missing data easily.
4 Econometric method
In this section we summarize our econometric estimation method, step by step. Most of the
technical details are relegated to appendices. Our main objective is to recover estimates of
individual e¤ects (i1; i2; i3) in the linear factor structure (1) by using identifying restrictions
presented in Section 3.
Stacking log wages ln yit and the stochastic component vit into T  1-vectors ln yi and vi as
well as ik into a 3 1-vector i, equation (1) writes:
ln yi = M () i + vi (6)
in whichM () is a T 3 matrix in which a constant, a linear and a geometric term are stacked.
As explained above, we split the estimation in two stages. First, we estimate aggregate
equation (2) group by group. At this aggregate level, we have 28 observations per group and
those have their own aggregate dynamics. This is why we estimate parameters in each group by
simple OLS as justied by condition (3). This provides consistent estimates of g; say bg; and
standard errors are computed using a Newey West procedure.
Second, within-group residuals, ui, can be expressed as a function of centered individual
specic parameters, ci as:
ui = M () 
c
i + v
c
i : (7)
in which vci = vi   vg(i). Because some data are missing, inference might be poor if we estimate
this last equation individual by individual since there are at most 28 observations in our data.
Let Ti  T denote the number of observations for individual i; estimates of parameters i for
every individual prole are consistent when Ti !1 but, in small samples, the bias is of the order
1=Ti (e.g. Arellano and Bonhomme, 2012). To overcome this di¢ culty, ci are estimated using
a two-step strategy which consists rst in estimating a exible random e¤ect model using the
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whole sample and second, in estimating equation (7) by FGLS, individual by individual. In the
second step xed e¤ect procedure, the FGLS weight is the inverse of the population covariance
matrix of vci over time estimated in the rst random e¤ect step.
Arguments underlying such an estimation strategy are based on trading o¤ the consistency
properties of random e¤ect methods when the time dimension is small and the exibility of the
xed e¤ect methods. On the one hand, estimating serial correlation by random e¤ects in a rst
step, allows general serial correlation to be controlled for, in the xed e¤ect estimation, so that
the latter is presumably more precise. Gaining precision is also likely even if the random e¤ect
specication is only an approximation of a more complicated data generating process. Further-
more, random e¤ect estimation provides a benchmark against which we can assess the amount
of bias in the xed e¤ect estimation due to the nite length of the observation period for each
prole. On the other hand, random e¤ects methods provides estimates of means and covari-
ances only. Fixed e¤ect estimates bring about richer information on the underlying distribution
of individual specic parameters.
Combining aggregate and individual specic estimates yields xed e¤ect estimates of the
original factor loadings:
^i = bg + ^ci :
We now present random and xed e¤ect methods in more detail.
4.1 Random E¤ects
Equation (7) and mean independence restrictions (5) lead to:5
E(ui j ci) = M()ci ;
V (ui j ci) = V (vci j ci)  
(ci);
and:
V (ui) = V (E(ui j ci)) + E(V (ui j ci)) = M()V (ci)M()0 + E(
(ci)): (8)
Our parameter of interest in this equation is the covariance matrix of the individual e¤ects,
V (ci) standing for the covariances between level, slope and curvature parameters. Identifying
the covariance matrix requires restrictions on the average variance of the idiosyncratic errors,
5Appendix B presents the full specication of the process for vcit in which we also deal with initial conditions
in the most general way used in the dynamic panel data literature. The covariance matrix of initial conditions is
free as well as the covariance between those initial conditions and the individual specic parameters ci . Further
details are given in the supplementary Appendix S.II.
14
E(
(ci)). An ARMA specication is common in the earnings dynamic literature and generally
low orders are used (see Guvenen, 2009, or Hryshko, 2012) whereas an alternative is a compos-
ition of permanent and transitory shocks with specic structures (Blundell, 2014, Bonhomme
and Robin, 2009, Lochner and Shin, 2014). We refrain from decomposing vci into its persist-
ent and transitory components since those are not identied absent additional restrictions and
consumption data (Ejrnæs and Browning, 2014).
Arellano and Bonhomme (2012) show that a nite lag ARMA specication is su¢ cient to
identify V (ci). We use this result and proceed by specifying that the processes v
c
it belong in the
family of time-heteroskedactic ARMA processes although we limit the orders of the AR and MA
to vary between 1 and 3. This allows the robustness of the estimated covariance of individual
e¤ects, V (ci), to the orders of the ARMA process to be assessed. Moreover, we allow for
time heteroskedasticity of the innovations whose importance is argued by Alvarez and Arellano
(2004). What the decomposition (8) shows in addition, is that a restricted form of individual
heterogeneity, possibly dependent on parameters, i, could be allowed in the ARMA process,
provided that the expected value, E(
(ci)), remains in the ARMA family that we consider.
The most commonly used minimum distance method for estimating equation (8) is severely
small-sample biased since the range of moments involved when the time dimension becomes
large makes rst order asymptotics a poor guide in empirical research. Okui (2009) derives the
small sample biases not only in the mean but also in the variance of GMM estimates due to the
presence of too many moments and he suggests some moment selection mechanism. This is why
some researchers proposed to return to an OLS set up adding a bias correction step (Fernandez-
Val and Weidner, 2018) or to maximum or pseudo-maximum likelihood methods that reduce the
number of moments available (Alvarez and Arellano, 2004).
Specically, the estimation method proposed by Alvarez and Arellano (2004) seems to dom-
inate in Monte Carlo experiments other xed T consistent estimators such as the maximum
likelihood estimator using di¤erenced data, and the corrected within group estimator. This
method is particularly well adapted to the case in which there are missing data in wage dy-
namics. For any missing data conguration, it consists in deleting the rows and columns of the
covariance matrix corresponding to missing data and write the likelihood function accordingly.
Under a normality assumption, the implicit moment selection underlying this estimation method
is optimal, and though the method loses optimality in the non-normal cases, it is still useful for
moment selection and for small-sample bias reduction (Okui, 2009).
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4.2 Fixed e¤ects
Random e¤ect estimates can now be exploited to construct individual specic estimates of para-
meters ci . First, if the ARMA model that we retained above is the correct specication of every
stochastic individual prole, xed e¤ect estimates are linear combinations of residuals uit and
those FGLS estimates are optimally weighted to account for serial dependence. Supplementary
Appendix S.III indeed proves that the individual e¤ect estimates are given by:
^ci = B^ui; (9)
in which matrix B is a function of random e¤ect parameters, such as those governing serial
correlation of transient errors and the covariance between the individual parameters and the
initial conditions. Its estimate, B^, is obtained by plugging-in the expression of B, their respective
random e¤ect estimates.
Second, even if the ARMA model is incorrect, those estimates are still consistent when
Ti ! 1 because what matters is the mean independence of individual e¤ects with respect to
factors stated in equation (5), and not the specic form of serial dependence. Their standard
errors should, however, be corrected. We use Newey-West robust standard errors in the empirical
section. Nonetheless, FGLS relying on serial dependence as estimated by random e¤ects, exploits
the information that we have about "aggregate" serial dependence, as opposed to a simple OLS or
non-linear least square estimate (Polachek et al, 2015). It enhances the quality of the estimates if
the term 
 (ci) in equation (8), is not too heterogeneous and this will be checked after estimation.
Consistency properties could, however, be misleading since Ti varies in our sample between
4 and 28. To assess the magnitude of the bias, we shall compare the estimates of the covariance
matrix of ci that we obtained by random e¤ect and by xed e¤ect methods by grouping individual
proles according to the length of the observation periods.
Abstracting rst from estimating errors, an unfeasible estimate of individual e¤ects is dened
as:
~ci = Bui = 
c
i +Bi;
in which random vector i has mean zero conditionally on 
c
i and covariance matrix, 
: This
new notation, i; is introduced since it di¤ers from v
c
i in equation (7) because of the correlation
of initial conditions with ci . These objects and this expression are dened and derived in the
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supplementary appendix S.III. We have:
V (~ci) = EV (~
c
i j ci) + V E(~ci j ci)
=) V (~ci) = B
B0 + V (ci); (10)
a biased estimate of V (ci). The bias term is B
B
0 and it is easy to show that the dominating
term is of order 1=Ti.
Our feasible estimate has an additional bias given by the measurement equation,
^ci = B^ui = ~
c
i + (B^  B)i;
although this term is in 1=
p
N and thus dominated, in large N and moderate Ti samples, by
the bias in 1=Ti.
We estimate the bias in equation (10) by replacing, in the expression, B
B0, the unknowns
by their corresponding random e¤ect estimates and derive a bias-corrected estimate of the true
variance of xed e¤ects, V (ci) (e.g. Arellano and Bonhomme, 2012, and Jochmans and Weidner,
2018).
5 Results
We rst describe the estimated parameters of the aggregate equation (2) in Section 5.1 and
turn to the estimation results of the within group wage equation by random e¤ect methods in
Section 5.2. In Section 5.3 we comment on the estimates of xed individual e¤ects and present
descriptive statistics of these estimates. We wind up the section with robustness checks and
other diagnostics.
5.1 Average e¤ects estimation
For estimating series 'gt in equation (3), we use a simplication of the at spot approach proposed
by Heckman, et al. (1998) and developed by Bowlus and Robinson (2012). Details of the
estimation of a single series of human capital prices are presented at the end of the Data Appendix
A. In a nutshell, human capital prices are estimated using a population of older males whose
potential experience ranges from 25 to 40 (e.g. whose age stands between 43 and 58, see Appendix
A) as in Bowlus and Robinson (2012). Those prices are used to deate real wages.
Table 2 presents for each of the 20 groups the estimated aggregate group parameters from
equation (2). They exhibit expected patterns. The rst factor loading average g1 ranges from
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2.4 for the lowest skill groups to 3.4 for the highest skill groups  a 100% di¤erence. The
estimated average slope , g2 ranges from 0.017 to 0.07 in the range of Mincers estimates (e.g.
Lagakos et al., 2018). As the previous average, it is larger for the high-skilled groups than for
the low-skilled ones although the evidence is weaker. The geometric factor loading average g3
is negative as expected or non signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Interestingly the pattern of correlations of the average e¤ects across education groups (weighted
by group size) is very close to the correlation pattern of centered factor loadings, estimated by
random e¤ects, presented next in Table 3.
5.2 Random e¤ect estimates
Random e¤ect estimates when disturbances, vcit; are ARMA(p; q) in which p and q vary between
1 and 3 are reported in the Supplementary Appendix in Tables S.iv and S.v. Those results
and the Akaike criterion reported in Table S.iii made us choose an ARMA(3; 1) as our preferred
specication.6 We comment below ARMA(3; 1) results as well as other parameters that can be
constructed from those.
The estimated covariance matrix of the centered individual e¤ects, ci is stable across the
di¤erent specications of ARMA processes as shown in Table 3. Their standard deviations
are very precisely estimated at around .30 for the "level" factor loading, ci1, and .25 for the
curvature one, ci3, and at around .04 for the slope, 
c
i2. The correlation between the slope and
curvature factor loadings is very strongly negative and equal to  :95 consistently across ARMA
specications. The magnitude of this correlation and its sign are consistent with the structural
model that ties in parameters i2 and i3: the larger the slope, the more curved the wage prole.
The retraction force due to the horizon is stronger for high wage growth workers.
The correlation coe¢ cient between the curvature, ci3; and the level, 
c
i1; factor loadings is
also signicantly negative around -0.6 and conrms that the retraction force at the end of the
life cycle is also stronger for highly skilled workers. The correlation between the level and slope
factor loadings, ci1 and 
c
i2, is positive and around .5. This is related to the result in the recent
literature (e.g. Lagakos et al, 2018, Engbom, 2018) that wage growth is signicantly higher for
more educated individuals in a very heterogeneous setting (also Guvenen, 2007).
Returning to the correlation across aggregate e¤ects, the coe¢ cient of correlation between
g1 and g2 (i.e. by varying g) is equal to 0.66 and close to the random e¤ect estimate of the
6Increasing the order of the MA decreases the AIC criterion very moderately and some of the parameters are
very imprecisely estimated (see Table S.iv).
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correlation between ci1 and 
c
i2, which is equal to 0.5. The estimated correlation between g1
and g3 is negative,  0:64 and very close to the random e¤ect estimate,  0:636. The estimated
correlation between g2 and g3 of  0:96, is also very close to the random e¤ect estimate,  0:95.
This result evinces that human capital investment patterns between and within groups are
similar in France in contrast to what was found in the US (Heckman et al., 1998). We attribute
this di¤erence to the stability of relative human capital prices across groups over this period in
France. Our specication nonetheless slightly deviates from previous ones, by the introduction
of a curvature factor and the control of initial conditions.
Irrespective of the order of the ARMA process, the initial conditions are negatively correlated
with the level factor loadings, ci1, positively with the slope e¤ect, 
c
i2, and negatively with the
curvature one, ci3.
7 These initial conditions account for the strong transitory conditions that
seem to a¤ect the wage process at the beginning of the working life (as well as the impact
of our data selection process).8 Even if the (log) wage process is asymptotically stationary,
initial conditions are denitely not set on the stationary path that corresponds to this process.
Moreover, in all ARMA specications, the standard deviation of individual and time specic
transitory shocks is decreasing over time. Individual specic frictions decrease over time and
this result is found across di¤erent countries (e.g. Bagger et al., 2014, Bowlus et Liu, 2012).
Goodness-of-t is examined in di¤erent graphs. In Figure 2, we report how the estimated
variances as well as the observed variances evolve over time. They t very nicely in the rst part
of the sample (until 1994) but this breaks down after 1994 after which the shape of the evolution
of variances is similar, albeit at a level which is higher than the observed level. It conrms that
1994 is an abnormal year even if the goodness-of-t for autocorrelations is good as reproduced
in Figures 3 and 4.
We tried di¤erent mechanisms in order to understand better the discrepancy between ob-
served and predicted variance proles. One possibility is to allow for an additional measurement
error term in 1994 for instance, like in Guvenen (2009) or to drop this year altogether. These
attempts did not a¤ect goodness-of-t. A more disturbing explanation for those discrepancies is
that it reects a failure in the missing at random hypothesis. When one represents the evolution
of the variance of wages over the life-cycle using xed e¤ect estimates (see below), it clearly
7Estimates of the covariances between the factor loadings and the initial conditions are reported in Table S.iv
in the Supplementary Appendix.
8The strong decrease of the variance observed during the rst years might partly be due to the very stringent
selection made in the 1977 entry cohort. The very exible initial conditions, as they are accounted for in the
random e¤ect estimation, also control for this selection.
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appears that the level of these proles negatively depends on the number of periods in which
we observe each individual. Variances are larger for individuals who have shorter spells in the
panel. Nevertheless, correcting for non random attrition seems out of the scope of this paper
and we leave it for further research.9
5.3 Fixed e¤ect estimation
We now turn to the estimation results by FGLS of the three individual factor loadings from
individual wage proles. Technical details are given in Section 4.2 and completed in the Sup-
plementary Appendix S.III. Estimated group averages are added to within group estimates to
reconstruct the nal estimates of individual e¤ects, ^i.
Table 4 reports estimates of the bias-corrected covariance matrix of centered individual ef-
fects, obtained by xed e¤ect methods, and compare them to the random e¤ect benchmark.
Standard errors for any function of xed e¤ects are computed using sampling variability to
which is added the e¤ects of parameter uncertainty due to random e¤ect estimation. We use
Monte Carlo simulations to compute the latter by sampling 1,000 times in the asymptotic dis-
tribution of random e¤ects estimates.
Our working sample to be used from now on, gathers individuals observed over more than
21 periods only, because small-Ti bias issues seem to be lingering for observations Ti  20:
Tables S.vi and S.vii in the Supplementary Appendix report raw and bias-corrected estimates
in the full sample and justify such a selection, to which we return in the robustness section
below. As random and xed e¤ects do not strictly refer to the same population because of
this selection, discrepancies seem very moderate between random and xed e¤ect estimates as
Figure 5 reporting variance estimates conrm.
Table 4 also reports these estimates by subsamples indexed by a varying number of periods
of observation from 21 to 28. It clearly appears that the longer the observation period, the less
variable individual e¤ects. It might be due to subsisting small-T bias that we imperfectly control.
It might also indicate that subpopulations, with exits or/and reentries, are more heterogenous
that the subpopulation of those who remains in the private sector all along. Random e¤ect
estimates would reect the mixture of these subpopulations.
9Furthermore, the conditions for consistency of xed e¤ect estimates described below are less stringent since
the missing at random assumption can be weakened and taken as conditional on individual e¤ects.
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5.4 Predictions
We can assess whether predictions of human capital models conform with these estimates. We
look at the Mincer dip, the prediction about the covariance between wage and wage growth and
the correlation between wage growth and initial wage level.
Mincer dip First, all estimates generate a neat Mincer dip at the beginning of the life-cycle
after 4 to 8 years a little longer than expected (Mincer, 1974). This is shown by plotting, in
Figure 5, the prole of predicted variances of wages along the life-cycle computed using random
and, raw and bias-corrected, xed e¤ect estimates. We display, in this graph, the life-cycle prole
of variances of the permanent e¤ects, given by the combination of factors and factor loadings
(V (M()ci)) in which matrix M() is composed of a constant, trend and geometric terms, see
equation (6). Stochastic transitory earnings, vci , obscure the comparison between estimates and
are excluded from the graph. Wage proles using raw and bias-corrected xed e¤ect estimates
reproduce the random e¤ect variance prole at a slightly higher level during the rst years of
working life in Figure 5. Discrepancies with random e¤ect estimates seem however second order
in particular at later periods in the life-cycle and this validates the use of this selected sample
in the decomposition of inequalities and counterfactual variations in Section 6.
Correlation between wage and subsequent wage growth Second, as developed in Ru-
binstein and Weiss (2006), a human capital model predicts that the covariance between wage
levels and subsequent wage growth should be negative when the person enters the labour market,
and should turn positive after some time, in contrast to a job search model in which the correl-
ation remains negative. This is what Table 5 conrms. In the working sample, covariances are
negative in years 1977 and 1982 and turn positive and signicant from 1987 onwards, although
the increase over time is not monotonic. This is slightly more pronounced for the high-skilled
group. While Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) use data on residual wages, smoothed over three
years and show that this covariance increases over time, it remains negative (their Figures 8a-8e
in Section 4.2). Our focus on the permanent e¤ects that lter out transitory components allows
to go a step further and produces a prediction in contradiction with a pure job-search rationale
at least after ten years in the labour market.
Initial wage levels and returns to experience Initial skills and skills acquired during the
education stage, are shown to be complementary (see Heckman, Humphries and Veramendi,
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2017). It is thus interesting to measure the complementarity over the life cycle by computing
the correlation between the initial log wage and the returns at each point of the life-cycle as in
Gladden and Taber (2009). By ltering out the transitory components at the beginning of the
life cycle, we are able to look more precisely at the complementarity between estimated initial
wage levels by equation (1), computed as the estimate of i1 + i3 and returns.
Returns to experience are computed as the marginal e¤ects of potential experience, t, on the
permanent component i.e. i2  log() ti3: These returns are decreasing because log() < 0
and estimated i3 are mostly negative. As shown in Table 6, while the correlation is signicant
and negative at the beginning of the life-cycle (the rst twenty years) as in Gladden and Taber
(2009) and Sorensen and Vejlin (2014), it turns positive and signicant afterwards. This result
is true in the working sample and in various skill subsamples. Yet, the correlation between the
long-run log wage and the corresponding returns remain negative and signicant.
The negative correlation at the beginning of the life-cycle is due to the negative correlation
between the initial log wage, i1+i3, and the growth e¤ect, i2. The positive correlation between
the second curvature term  log() ti3 and the initial log wage kicks in after 20 years to
reverse this foregoing negative correlation. Individuals with high initial log wages tend to have
higher returns later in the life-cycle. It emphasizes the importance of considering horizon e¤ects
(Lillard and Reville, 1998) in the analysis of wage proles.
5.5 Robustness and other diagnostics
We tested various departures from our baseline estimates to check that our results are robust.
We also comment on additional goodness-of-t diagnostics.
The rst issue is the estimation of the series by a at spot approach that underpins the
identifying restriction (3). The dynamics of human capital accumulation depends on whether
the average wage or productivity prole is attributed to human capital only or to other factors
(physical capital for instance). To control for this issue, we also repeated our procedures by
deating real wage by a series of average labor productivity. Results change only marginally
with respect to the results that were presented above.
As serial correlation a¤ects inference, we also vary the number of lags in the Newey West
procedures without much impact overall.
Another issue is related to the quality of the correction of the bias in the xed e¤ect estimates
that we reported. In Tables S.vi and S.vii in the Supplementary Appendix which report raw and
bias-corrected estimates, the magnitude of all covariance estimates decreases with the number of
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period of observations, as expected by the computations of Section 4.2. Bias-correction attens
these estimates by factors of 2 to 3 when the number of periods is small but it decreases to
10-20% when the number of periods is 20. There is a clear break in these Tables between the
estimates below and above 20 and this is why we chose to work with the 21+ sample. As
expected the bias correction becomes negligible when Ti = 28: The counterfactual analyses that
we present below are robust to a change in this threshold.
The comparison between random e¤ect and xed e¤ect estimates implicitly relies on an
homogeneity assumption of the residuals, v^ci as a function of i. When plotting the variance
proles of these residuals in groups dened either by skills or by age of entry, we nd very little
di¤erences between those groups (see Figure S.iii in the Supplementary appendix). The three-
factor structure seems to be su¢ cient to describe the individual permanent heterogeneity in our
data and this partly justies ex-post the homogeneity assumption of the covariance matrix of
transitory terms in the random e¤ect specication as well as the homogeneity assumption of the
discount factor which is used to measure the curvature or horizon e¤ect.
6 Wage inequalities: decompositions and counterfactual
impacts
We now exploit those estimates to study the impact of heterogeneity on life-cycle wages and
decompose wage inequalities at a point in time and over the life-cycle. When we use xed e¤ect
bias-corrected estimates, we only use information on the most stable trajectories (Ti  21) for
which we compute various counterfactuals of interest.
6.1 Counterfactual impacts on means
The log wage equation (6) writes:
log yi = M()(g(i) + 
c
i) + v
c
i ;
and we assess the e¤ect on average log wages of increasing each component of i = g(i)+
c
i by one
tenth of its standard deviation. Those experiments can be easily expressed as a transformation
of ci into (
c
i) and we have that:
 log yi = log yi((
c
i))  log yi;
= M()((ci)  ci):
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We report mean impacts, every ve years, starting in 1977 their year of entry into the labor
market and nishing the last year of observation in 2007. We refrain from extrapolating to
further periods in the future. We also consider a longer-run measure of wages over the observed
life-cycle, an appropriately discounted aggregate of log wages that happens to correspond to
intertemporal utility over the observed prole of wages, normalized in such a way that it can be
compared with the annual values (see Magnac et al., 2018):
log y
(LR)
i =
1  
(1  T )
TX
t=1
t log yit: (11)
Those impacts are reported in Table 7. Unsurprisingly because only levels of log wages are
a¤ected, the impact of increasing the level, i1, by one tenth of its standard deviation has a
constant short-run and long-run impact around 0.03 i.e. 3% on the wage level except in the
rst year because initial conditions blur the impact. This is somewhat below the average slope
of proles (Table 2) and thus, somewhat below the e¤ect of an additional year of experience at
the beginning of the life cycle. In contrast, the impacts of increases of one tenth of a standard
deviation in i2 (returns) and i3 (horizon) increase from 1977 to 2007 as they accumulate over the
life-cycle. At the end of the period of observation, they have sizeable magnitudes slightly above
0.15 on the log wage in the terminal year 2017. E¤ects on the long-run value are less important
and around .06 (returns) or .07 (horizon). Overall, these results mean that the heterogeneity in
level, slope and curvature that we consider is economically signicant.
We now address two questions related to the decomposition of the variance of log wages into
its di¤erent components.
6.2 Short-run and long-run inequality decompositions
Table 8 provides decompositions of within-cohort inequalities and long-run inequality into ob-
served heterogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and transitory components. Using random e¤ect
estimates, decompositions are derived from writing the log wage equation as:
log yi = M()g(i) +D
c
i + i;
in which the three components g(i); 
c
i and i are orthogonal between each other and are inter-
preted as observed heterogeneity, unobserved individual heterogeneity and individual-and-time
specic frictions. This expression deals with the absence of orthogonality between permanent
and transitory components because of initial conditions. Initial conditions are negatively cor-
related with i1 and i3, and these e¤ects play an important role during the rst years of the
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working life (Table S.iv of the Supplementary appendix). To make them orthogonal, initial con-
ditions are rst projected onto individual e¤ects ci and this projection is aggregated with the
impact of individual e¤ects ci in the term, D
c
i ; and the residuals with the transitory ones in
the term i. Supplementary appendix S.III gives more details.
We report results obtained by random e¤ects in the rst panel of Table 8 and by xed e¤ects
in the second panel. Results obtained using random or xed e¤ect estimates are very close to
each other and we will comment the latter only. The last column of these Tables reports the
predicted variance of log-wages V (log yit) every ve years from 1977 to 2007 as well as the long-
run value dened in equation (11). These results conform with the inverted U-shape of variances
as in Figure 1. The variance of long-run log wages is lower since transitory components over
the life cycle are partly averaged out. The ratio of short-run inequalities to the long run one is
varying between 1.22 in 1982 and 1.82 in 2007, well in line with Bonke et al. (2014).
The rst three columns respectively report the share of the variance due to observed hetero-
geneity, V (M()g(i)), the share of the variance attributable to unobserved individual hetero-
geneity, V (Dci), and the share of the variance generated by transitory components, V (i). Note
that the decomposition in 1977 seems to be quite di¤erent from the one in other years because
of the eventful process at the beginning of a working life. The weight in percentage terms of
the transitory component is similar to other years but the variance of unobserved heterogeneity
is almost absent. This is partly due to the orthogonalisation procedure that we have just dis-
cussed above, whereby negative correlations between initial conditions and xed e¤ects lower
the contribution of permanent unobserved heterogenity to the variance of log wages.
Nonetheless, on average, 68% of the variance is due to the combination of the observed and
unobserved heterogeneity factors in 1977 and 1982. This share displays an increase over the
life cycle from 68% to 91% thirty years later. As a mirror image, the share of the variance
explained by transitory components decreases sharply from 32% in 1982 to 8.5% in 2007 as
well as the share due to the observed heterogeneity component, albeit at a lesser degree from
35% to 25%. This is the consequence of an increase in the importance of unobserved individual
heterogeneity, which doubles its contribution to the variance of log wages from 33% to 66%.
As expected, these e¤ects are weighted di¤erently when the long-run value of log wages (i.e.
equation (11)) is computed. The transitory e¤ect is lower (less than 6%) and observed and
unobserved heterogeneity components have roughly equal contributions (45 and 49%).
The sum of the observed and unobserved heterogeneity contributions is larger than the ones
found by Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011), who nd that the initial endowments related
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to human capital (initial human capital and learning ability as well as initial wealth) account
for 60% of the variance of lifetime wage. Their framework however allows for less pervasive
unobserved heterogeneity, than we do here, so that we capture more unobserved heterogeneity
than they do.
We now turn to decompositions involving each specic factor loading.
6.3 Heterogeneity components
We can further decompose observed and unobserved heterogeneity into its constituent parts:
level, i1, slope, i2, and curvature, i3. Denote the permanent heterogeneity variable, as dened
in equation (6):
pi = M()
[1 p;T ]i:
If observed heterogeneity only is present (i.e. i = g(i)), the variance of pi is the variance of an
homogenous Mincer equation. If there is as much heterogeneity as is estimated, this delivers the
estimated V (pi) as might be computed from previous Table 8. Between these two benchmarks,
we can compute hypothetical variances of the permanent e¤ect by shutting down some of its
components. For instance, in experiment 2 below, we consider that i1 is equal to the estimated
value while i2 and i3 are set to the sum of the observable components, g(i)2 and g(i)3; and the
predictable components of i2 and i3 given i1. In other words we restrict heterogeneity to a
single component, the level in order to assess its impact. We do the same for other components,
slope and curvature.
We report variances of log wages, every 5 years, as well as the long-run value of log-wages,
in the following ve experiments:
1. Observable benchmark: heterogeneity in level, slope and curvature restricted to ob-
servables i1 = g(i)1, i2 = g(i)2 and i3 = g(i)3.
2. Heterogeneity in level: heterogeneity in slope and curvature restricted to observables.
Analytically, i1 = g(i)1 + ^i1;the estimated value and i2 = g(i)2 + !21^
c
i1 and i3 =
g(i)3 + !31^
c
i1 as predicted using the correlations between the components of 
c
i .
3. Heterogeneity in slope: heterogeneity in level and curvature restricted to observables 
i2 = estimated value, i1 and i3 equal to the sum of group values and predictions given
^i2 using the correlations between the components of 
c
i .
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4. Heterogeneity in curvature: heterogeneity in level and slope restricted to observables
i3 = estimated value, i1 and i2 equal to the sum of group values and predictions given
^i3 using the correlations between the components of 
c
i .
5. Heterogeneity in slope and curvature: heterogeneity in level restricted to observables
 i2 and i3 = estimated values, i1 equal to the sum of group values and predictions
given ^i2 and ^i3 using the correlations between the components of 
c
i .
Table 9 reports variances of the counterfactual permanent variables, pi, dened by such a
sequence of experiments as they can be constructed from xed e¤ect estimates in the working
sample. Rows report them every ve years from 1977 to 2007 as well as the long-run variance.
The last column reports the estimated variance of pi. The rst to the fth column report
variances for every experiment 1 to 5 described above.
First, as shown in the previous section, observables explain most of the permanent hetero-
geneity in 1977, which is hardly surprising, since observables are age at entry and observed
skills in the rst job. This explanatory power declines afterwards down to less that 30% in 2007
(column 1, Table 9). Second, the heterogeneity in level explains most of the remaining variance
of the permanent component in 1982 but this contribution remains almost constant over the
years while the variance of the permanent component increases (column 2). This shows the
limit of panel data analyses in which a single unobserved heterogeneity component in levels is
considered. Third, the heterogeneity in slope or in curvature contributes less to the variance
of the permanent component at the beginning of the life cycle but their contributions increase
until a single heterogeneity dimension in the growth or the curvature almost perfectly predict
the variance of the permanent component in 2007.
Nonetheless, explaining heterogeneity in the long run variance requires the presence of the
three factor loadings. None of them alone, or combined for i2 and i3, succeeds in explaining
fully the permanent wage component variance. This is because the long-run variance combines
elements at the beginning of the life cycle which are well explained by the level while the second
and third components are associated with what happens later in the life-cycle.
The same Table for the low and medium skill group is displayed in the Supplemental Ap-
pendix S.viii and they exhibit the same patterns. Table 10 reports the same exercise for the high
skill group.10 In this group, the variance of the permanent components seem less predictable by
only one or two heterogeneous components and the three factor loadings seem necessary.
10For this group, the importance of observables is lower since the skill in the rst job is less well described.
27
Overall, these results conrm the importance of taking into account an heterogeneous slope
coe¢ cient for experience as well as allowing for an horizon e¤ect.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze wage proles by using an observable microfounded factor model, based
on human capital investments, and ARMA individual-and-time errors. Three factor loadings 
level, slope and curvature describe wage proles. We propose an estimation method of the
factor loadings based on a sequence of intertwined random and xed e¤ect methods. We show
the importance of considering pervasive heterogeneity to model wage proles and o¤er a set of
decompositions of wage inequalities in terms of observed and unobserved heterogeneity as well as
in terms of level, slope and curvature of the individual wage proles. In particular, heterogeneous
horizon e¤ects, which are not considered in the literature, are shown to be quite important, at
least after 20 years of experience.
Much remains of be done at the methodological level. The issue of missing data seems at the
top of the agenda since the selection of balanced panels, or the missing at random assumption,
might bias our view of inequalities since we select more stable subpopulations. Other ways of
modelling transitory components might be in order and in particular, more attention might be
paid to what can be anticipated by agents as in Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005). We leave
all these issues for future research.
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APPENDICES
A Data Appendix
As in Le Minez and Roux (2002), we consider individuals right from their entry into the labor
market and onwards. Labor market entry is dened as being employed for more than 6 months
and being still employed the following year, possibly in di¤erent rms. For the entry cohort
of interest which starts in 1977, this leads us to select from the administrative data 36; 883
individuals who were employed more than 6 months in 1977 and at least one day in 1978.
Among them, 53% have worked but not permanently before. Conversely, individuals who have
worked in 1977 are not considered as entrants if their jobs are not permanent enough. They
may however enter with a subsequent cohort.
In addition, we aim at keeping employees with a permanent full-time attachment to the
private sector only. Firstly, we consider workers employed full time only and we censor inform-
ation about part-time jobs. In addition to the condition which requires workers to work in the
private sector during the year of entry and the following one, we further restrict the sample to
men also working in 1982 and 1984. This is because we want to avoid dealing with non particip-
ation issues for females and with too many exits from the sample since the bulk of entries into
public service occurs at the beginning of the working life. These restrictions lead us to retain in
the 1977 entry cohort 16; 091 men who entered the labor market in 1977 in a full-time position
for more than 6 months and who were also full-time employed in 1978. Adding the condition
on the presence in a full-time position in 1982 and 1984 further restricts the sample to 8; 288
individuals. Finally, we keep only workers who were aged between 16 and 30 at their entry in
the labor market and this restricts the sample to 7; 446 workers.
We impose these restrictions in order to concentrate on a relatively homogeneous sample of
workers with a long term attachment to the private rmslabor market. Admittedly, it does not
represent the full working population. Because of the lack of a credible identication strategy
to correct for selection, we shall assume that selection is at random or can be conditioned
on individual-specic e¤ects only. The distribution functions of unobserved factor loadings or
idiosyncratic components that we estimate in the following refer to this subpopulation.
The empirical analysis uses "annualized" earnings which are thus better called wages. It
is dened as the sum of all earnings during the year divided by the number of days worked
and remultiplied by 360 (total number of days during the year in the administrative data).
Accounting only for total yearly earnings would miss other earnings from employment in the
public sector, self-employment income or unemployment benets that are not observed in the
data. Considering annualized earnings instead limits this problem, although it may lead to
overestimating yearly income. In order to weaken the possible impact of measurement error,
we coded as missing the rst and last percentiles of the earnings distribution in every period.
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Ination, as measured by consumer prices, leads to subtracting a factor equal to 1.17 to current
log-wages over the whole period. This can be roughly subdivided into two sub-periods between
1977 and 1986 in which this factor is equal to .77 and between 1986 and 2007 during which
ination levelled o¤ and this factor is equal to .40.
Age at labor market entry (in 1977) can only take odd integer values from 17 to 29, i.e
seven di¤erent values because of the specic sampling of the dataset. As groups formed by age
at entry and skills are dened according to characteristics recorded at the entry on the labor
market, individuals are attached to the same group during their whole working life.
Estimation of human capital prices by a at spot condition and robustness checks
We follow Bowlus and Robinson (2012). From the DADS, average log daily real wages by age
and year can be computed on full-time males employees in the Private Sector from 1976 to 2010.
To identify the at spotregion where human capital remains stable, we run regressions of the
average log daily real wage on potential experience (di¤erence between current age and 16), an
exponential term reecting the curvature of the wage prole with respect to potential experience,
and year dummies. We have run di¤erent regression changing the contributing individuals with
respect to their potential experience and selected the population with the broader range of
potential experience for which the coe¢ cients an potential experience and the exponential term
were statistically non signicant. This leads us to select individuals who are aged between 43
and 58 whose average log-wage prole did not exhibit any slope or curvature. The results of the
regressions and the human capital prices values are available upon request.
We then repeat the procedures that lead to the estimates of Table 2.
B Random e¤ect specication
Redening the time index accordingly, we shall assume that initial conditions of the process
(ui(1 p); :; ui0) are observed. The dynamic process is thus a function of the random variables
zi = (vi(1 p); :; vi0;  i(1 q); :;  iT ) which collect initial conditions of the autoregressive process
(vi(1 p); :; vi0); initial conditions of the moving average process ( i(1 q); :;  i0) and the idiosyncratic
shocks a¤ecting random shocks between 1 and T . We write the quasi-likelihood of the sample
using a multivariate normal distribution
zi  N(0;
z)
We dene vit as
vit = 1vi(t 1) + :::+ pvi(t p) + twit;
where wit is MA(q):
wit =  it    1 it 1   :::   q it q:
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The construction of the structure of 
z is detailed in the Supplementary Appendix S.II (Magnac
et al, 2014) although it can be summarized easily. The correlations between initial conditions
and individual e¤ects are not constrained, while innovations  it are assumed orthogonal to any
previous terms including initial conditions. However, the initial conditions (vi(1 p); :; vi0) can be
correlated with previous shocks as  i0; :;  i(1 q).
As for the individual e¤ects (ci1; 
c
i2; 
c
i3) we assume that they are independent of the idio-
syncratic shocks  i(1 q); :;  iT while they can be correlated with the initial conditions of the
autoregressive process (vi(1 p); :; vi0) in an unrestricted way. From these restrictions it is possible
to build the covariance matrix of the observed variables
V ui = (ui(1 p); :; ui0; ui1; :; uiT )  
u:
This covariance matrix, 
u; is a function of the parameters of the model that are the autoregress-
ive parameters fkgk=1;:::;p; the moving average parameters f kgk=1;:::;q; the covariance matrix
(conditional on groups) of c, ; the heteroskedastic components ftgt=1;:::;T and the covariance
of xed e¤ects and initial conditions,  0 (see Supplementary Appendix S.II).
A pseudo likelihood interpretation can always be given to this specication. As in Alvarez
and Arellano (2004), the estimates remain consistent under the much weaker assumption that:
E( it j i; ut 1i ) = 0;
although optimality properties of such an estimation method are derived under the normality
assumptions only.
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Table 1: Sample size
Age of Entry in 1977
Below 20 Between 20 and 23 Above 23 All
1977 4460 2112 874 7446
1978 4460 2112 874 7446
1979 3855 1923 787 6565
1980 3748 1930 785 6463
1982 4460 2112 874 7446
1984 4460 2112 874 7446
1985 3792 1808 724 6324
1986 3683 1800 726 6209
1987 3569 1741 678 5988
1988 3402 1654 637 5693
1989 3486 1657 644 5787
1991 3319 1598 613 5530
1992 3299 1581 603 5483
1993 3330 1620 627 5577
1994 2508 1316 503 4327
1995 3256 1566 578 5400
1996 3236 1557 579 5372
1997 3202 1529 556 5287
1998 3208 1521 543 5272
1999 3218 1503 547 5268
2000 3180 1506 536 5222
2001 3117 1480 517 5114
2002 3018 1463 511 4992
2003 2800 1323 467 4590
2004 2844 1387 463 4694
2005 2851 1399 467 4717
2006 2896 1382 442 4720
2007 2864 1377 429 4670
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Table 2: Group averages of individual factor loadings ηg
Skill group Age group Nb Obs ηg1 ηg2 ηg3
2 17 1268 2.4 0.04 -0.15
(0.032) (0.0067) (0.051)
3 17 1224 2.4 0.039 -0.15
(0.039) (0.0056) (0.04)
1 19 41 2.7 0.07 -0.33
(0.038) (0.0057) (0.042)
2 19 934 2.6 0.044 -0.17
(0.035) (0.0046) (0.034)
3 19 994 2.5 0.042 -0.17
(0.04) (0.007) (0.051)
1 21 117 2.9 0.052 -0.22
(0.086) (0.0085) (0.068)
2 21 710 2.7 0.047 -0.2
(0.014) (0.0024) (0.018)
3 21 512 2.6 0.041 -0.19
(0.015) (0.0026) (0.019)
1 23 171 3.1 0.055 -0.24
(0.018) (0.0036) (0.027)
2 23 348 2.7 0.05 -0.21
(0.026) (0.0037) (0.028)
3 23 254 2.7 0.051 -0.25
(0.046) (0.0053) (0.04)
1 25 191 3.3 0.061 -0.29
(0.056) (0.0066) (0.05)
2 25 146 2.8 0.038 -0.14
(0.059) (0.0065) (0.046)
3 25 93 2.6 0.033 -0.09
(0.018) (0.0031) (0.024)
1 27 114 3.4 0.047 -0.21
(0.019) (0.0045) (0.034)
2 27 87 3 0.061 -0.32
(0.02) (0.0034) (0.025)
3 27 63 2.7 0.03 -0.079
(0.036) (0.005) (0.039)
1 29 58 3.2 0.041 -0.14
(0.052) (0.0058) (0.041)
2 29 67 2.8 0.038 -0.2
(0.084) (0.013) (0.11)
3 29 55 2.6 0.017 0.0061
(0.048) (0.0074) (0.059)
Note: Estimation of equation (2). A flat spot deflator is used. Newey West standard errors in parentheses (5 lags).
37
Table 3: Estimated standard errors and correlations of individual effects ηci : Random effect esti-
mation
1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-1 3-2 3-3
ση1 .302 .302 .301 .310 .306 .304 .306 .300 .298
( .001) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) (.003) ( .003) ( .004)
ση2 .038 .039 .039 .038 .039 .036 .038 .037 .037
( .005) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
ση3 .255 .259 .256 .263 .260 .248 .258 .247 .242
( .005) ( .006) ( .006) ( .004) ( .005) ( .005) (.005) ( .006) ( .007)
ρη1,η2 .473 .413 .454 .571 .486 .610 .505 .485 .365
( .016) ( .021) .021 ( .013) ( .017) ( .013) ( .017) ( .020) ( .030)
ρη1,η3 - .604 - .548 - .586 - .694 - .618 - .729 - .636 - .620 - .509
( .003) ( .020) .019 ( .011) ( .015) ( .012) ( .016) ( .019) ( .029)
ρη2,η3 - .946 - .948 - .947 - .945 - .946 - .941 - .946 - .943 - .944
( .023) ( .003) .003 ( .002) ( .002) ( .003) ( .002) ( .003) ( .004)
Note: The first line corresponds to the ARMA specification (AR-MA) used for the random effect estimation.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4: Bias corrected covariance matrix of individual effects: fixed and random effect estimation
Sample periods V ar(η1) Cov(η1, η2) Cov(η1, η3) V ar(η2) Cov(η2, η3) V ar(η3)
21 0.18 0.012 -0.13 0.0034 -0.026 0.22
(0.029) (0.0032) (0.03) (0.00061) (0.0049) (0.043)
22 0.15 0.015 -0.13 0.0035 -0.027 0.22
(0.019) (0.0031) (0.026) (0.00067) (0.0053) (0.042)
23 0.16 0.012 -0.11 0.0035 -0.024 0.19
(0.017) (0.0024) (0.02) (5e-04) (0.0038) (0.03)
24 0.14 0.014 -0.12 0.0041 -0.03 0.23
(0.017) (0.0027) (0.022) (0.00061) (0.0047) (0.037)
25 0.13 0.01 -0.089 0.0028 -0.02 0.16
(0.014) (0.0023) (0.019) (0.00041) (0.0033) (0.027)
26 0.097 0.0066 -0.059 0.0025 -0.017 0.12
(0.0072) (0.00093) (0.0072) (0.00023) (0.0016) (0.012)
27 0.077 0.0046 -0.04 0.0017 -0.011 0.079
(0.0046) (0.00064) (0.0047) (0.00015) (0.001) (0.0074)
28 0.067 0.0036 -0.031 0.0015 -0.0097 0.067
(0.0049) (0.00067) (0.0047) (0.00016) (0.0011) (0.0074)
21+ sample 0.11 0.0078 -0.07 0.0025 -0.017 0.13
(0.0073) (0.00095) (0.0092) (0.00018) (0.0015) (0.013)
Random effects 0.093 0.0059 -0.05 0.0015 -0.0093 0.066
(0.0036) (0.00051) (0.004) (0.00011) (0.00079) (0.0059)
Notes: The first lines are obtained using fixed effect estimates. Sample periods = number of observed periods.
Standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent sampling and parameter uncertainty, 1000 MC simulations) between
brackets. The working sample (21+) has 4873 observations
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Table 5: Covariances of wage level and subsequent growth
Years All Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
1977 -0.00594 -0.00573 -0.00665 -0.00688
(0.000639) (0.000564) (0.000885) (0.00214)
1982 -0.000972 -0.00137 -0.00102 1.04e-05
(0.000388) (0.000303) (0.00052) (0.00149)
1987 0.00178 0.00113 0.00219 0.00336
(0.000271) (0.000198) (0.000402) (0.00119)
1992 0.00233 0.0018 0.00299 0.00334
(0.000207) (0.000162) (0.000357) (0.00089)
1997 0.00135 0.00115 0.00204 0.00133
(0.000174) (0.000139) (0.000324) (0.000637)
2002 0.000812 0.000838 0.00141 0.00108
(0.000269) (0.000229) (0.00042) (0.00108)
2007 0.00524 0.00459 0.00583 0.0109
(0.000666) (0.000593) (0.00114) (0.00304)
Observations 4873 2942 1433 498
Notes: The coefficient is the covariance between ηi1+ηi2t+ηi3β
−t and ηi2+β−t(1/β−1)ηi3.
Standard errors (heteroskedastic-consistent sampling and parameter uncertainty, 1000 MC
simulations) between brackets. The working sample (21+) has 4873 observations
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Table 6: Time varying correlation of initial levels and returns
Year All Low Med High
1977 -0.498 -0.674 -0.561 -0.379
(0.0521) (0.0425) (0.0682) (0.13)
1982 -0.505 -0.683 -0.564 -0.38
(0.0529) (0.043) (0.0705) (0.134)
1987 -0.509 -0.687 -0.561 -0.375
(0.0539) (0.0436) (0.0742) (0.139)
1992 -0.47 -0.635 -0.507 -0.31
(0.0527) (0.0436) (0.0776) (0.136)
1997 -0.186 -0.265 -0.201 0.000268
(0.0385) (0.042) (0.0664) (0.0796)
2002 0.156 0.207 0.186 0.212
(0.0346) (0.0392) (0.0458) (0.0765)
2007 0.286 0.389 0.338 0.276
(0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0444) (0.0888)
Long-run value -0.373 -0.507 -0.411 -0.247
(0.0407) (0.0335) (0.0596) (0.0997)
Note: The correlation is ρ = Corr(ηi1 + ηi3, ηi2 − log(β)β−tηi3) Only obser-
vations with more than 21 periods. 4873 observations. First column reports
results for centered individual effects while the other columns include aggergate
effects. The last three columns for low, medium and high skills.
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Table 7: Impacts of unobserved heterogeneity on mean log wages
Impact of {σj}j=1,.,3 on: Levelη1 → η1 + σ1
Slope
η2 → η2 + σ2
Curvature
η3 → η3 + σ3
Log-wage 1977 0.0112 0.0116 0.0199
(0.000203) (0.000336) (0.00062)
Log-wage 1982 0.0303 0.0263 0.0448
(0.000549) (0.000765) (0.0014)
Log-wage 1987 0.0325 0.0499 0.0601
(0.000587) (0.00145) (0.00187)
Log-wage 1992 0.0326 0.0747 0.0778
(0.00059) (0.00217) (0.00242)
Log-wage 1997 0.0326 0.0996 0.101
(0.00059) (0.0029) (0.00313)
Log-wage 2002 0.0326 0.124 0.13
(0.00059) (0.00362) (0.00405)
Log-wage 2007 0.0326 0.149 0.168
(0.00059) (0.00435) (0.00523)
Long-run value 0.0287 0.0573 0.0672
(0.00052) (0.00167) (0.00209)
Note: Average impact on log wages of an increase of a tenth of the standard deviation of: 2nd column,
unobserved heterogeneity in the initial human capital; third column, wage growth or returns; fourth column,
curvature or horizon.
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Table 8: Variance decomposition: random and fixed effects
Random Effects Obs. het. % Unobs. het. % Transitory % Total var.
Log-wage 1977 65.2 1.18 33.6 0.481
Log-wage 1982 34.8 33.1 32.1 0.133
Log-wage 1987 32.8 42 25.3 0.153
Log-wage 1992 29.7 49.9 20.4 0.179
Log-wage 1997 27.2 56 16.8 0.201
Log-wage 2002 26.2 60.8 13 0.206
Log-wage 2007 25.1 66.4 8.47 0.202
Long-run value 50.2 44.5 5.31 0.118
(1977-2007)
Note: The variance (5th column) of each variable (1st column) is decomposed into its component
shares which are reported in percentages in column 2 (observed heterogeneity), column 3 (unob-
served heterogeneity) and column 4 (transitory component). The share of variance of log 1982
wage (0.133) explained by observed heterogeneity is 34.8
Fixed Effects Obs. het. % Unobs. het. % Transitory % Total var.
Log-wage 1977 65 1.45 33.5 0.483
Log-wage 1982 33.5 35.7 30.9 0.138
Log-wage 1987 33.7 40.4 25.9 0.149
Log-wage 1992 31.2 47.3 21.5 0.17
Log-wage 1997 29 53 17.9 0.189
Log-wage 2002 28 58 14 0.193
Log-wage 2007 24.5 67.2 8.25 0.207
Long-run value 52.2 42.3 5.51 0.113
Note: See Table above. Bias corrected statistics. Only observations with more than 21 periods.
4873 observations.
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Table 9: Counterfactual variances of log wages
Years
η1 = η¯1g
η2 = η¯2g
η3 = η¯3g
Heterogeneity
in: Levels Growth Curvature
Growth
and
Curvature
All
1977 0.306 0.312 0.307 0.308 0.311 0.313
(0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.017) (0.017)
1982 0.0449 0.0924 0.0489 0.0547 0.0679 0.094
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0182)
1987 0.0491 0.103 0.0636 0.0667 0.0673 0.109
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0198)
1992 0.0523 0.107 0.0849 0.0818 0.085 0.133
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0222)
1997 0.0539 0.109 0.112 0.103 0.113 0.154
(0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0258)
2002 0.0533 0.108 0.144 0.136 0.144 0.165
(0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0313)
2007 0.05 0.105 0.18 0.188 0.188 0.189
(0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0402)
Long-run 0.0579 0.1 0.0771 0.0799 0.0801 0.106
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0201)
Note: Only observations with more than 21 periods. 4873 observations. The counterfactuals are described
in the text and measure the influence of each component of heterogeneity, in levels, growth and curvature.
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Table 10: Counterfactual variances of log wages: High skills
Years
η1 = η¯1g
η2 = η¯2g
η3 = η¯3g
Heterogeneity
in: Levels Growth Curvature
Growth
and
Curvature
All
1977 0.049 0.0636 0.0501 0.0522 0.0582 0.0642
(0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0678) (0.0681)
1982 0.0643 0.171 0.0698 0.0802 0.11 0.172
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.0741) (0.0743)
1987 0.0767 0.199 0.0966 0.105 0.112 0.209
(0.0814) (0.0814) (0.0814) (0.0814) (0.0815) (0.0818)
1992 0.0871 0.211 0.132 0.135 0.135 0.248
(0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0901) (0.0902) (0.0904)
1997 0.0929 0.216 0.172 0.173 0.174 0.276
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
2002 0.092 0.216 0.216 0.226 0.226 0.287
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
2007 0.0837 0.207 0.262 0.307 0.322 0.333
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127)
Long-run 0.0725 0.168 0.0988 0.108 0.114 0.177
(0.0814) (0.0815) (0.0814) (0.0814) (0.0816) (0.0818)
Note: High skills. Only observations with more than 21 periods. 498 observations. The counterfactuals
are described in the text and measure the influence of each component of heterogeneity, in levels, growth
and curvature.
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Figure 1: Mean log earnings by age at entry: 1977-2007
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Note: The small vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2: Cross-sectional variance of log wage residuals: 1977-2007
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Note: The small vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Log wage residuals are obtained by regressing
log wages on a saturated set of dummies for skill groups and years.
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Figure 3: Autocorrelations with 1986 and 2007
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Figure 4: Forward autocorrelations of order 1 and of order 6
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Figure 5: Variance of the permanent components
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Note: The permanent component is M (β) η defined in equation (6). The sample is restricted
to long history profiles (more than 21 periods). ”Random effects” are using estimates derived
from random effect estimation. ”Fixed effects” are using estimates derived from raw fixed effect
estimation and ”Bias corrected f.e.” are the bias corrected version of them.
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Supplementary Appendices
Only for Web publication
S.I Notation
S.I.1 The model
 t: time elapsed since the entry in the labor market.
 i: index for individuals.
 : homogenous discount rate
 T : Arbitrary date at which we examine whether individuals goes on investing in human capital,
last date of observation in the empirical application.
 i1: individual-specic xed level of log-wages.
 i2: individual-specic growth rate of log-wages.
 i3: individual-specic degree of curvature of log-wages.
 vit: (log) price of human capital net of cumulative depreciation.
 g: group of workers, dened by their age at entry and their skills
 ln ygt: average of ln yit over the group g
 gk: average of ik over g, for k = 1; 2; 3
 vgt: average of vit over g
 cik: centered individual e¤ect of ik, for k = 1; 2; 3
 uit: centered wages, with respect to group g
 vcit: individual-specic variations of human capital prices
S.I.2 Econometric Modeling
 M (): T; 3 matrix of factors.
 
 (ci ): covariance matrix of centered individual xed e¤ects.
 ^ci : estimate of the centered individual xed e¤ect.
 B: matrix 3; T establishing the relationship between the centered individual xed e¤ects and the
wages residuals.
S.i
 B^: estimate of B
 ~ci : unfeasible estimator of ci using B
 i: T -vector of residuals, orthogonal to ci
 
: covariance matrix of i
 Ti: number of actual observations for the individual i.
S.II The random e¤ect model : Model Specication and
Likelihood function
The main di¤erence with standard specications lies in the introduction of three individual
heterogeneity factors that interact in a specic way with factors depending on time. Equation
(7) writes
u
[1;T ]
i = M ()
[1;T ] ci + v
c[1;T ]
i
where u[1;T ]i = (ui1; :::; uiT )
0, vc[1;T ]i = (v
c
i1; :::; v
c
iT )
0, ci = (
c
i1; 
c
i2; 
c
i3) are the centered versions of
the s and:
M ()[1;T ] =
264 1 1 1=... ... ...
1 T 1=T
375 ;
is a [T; 3] matrix. The system is further completed by initial conditions, the number of which
depends on the order of the autoregressive process. Denote p this order and write the initial
conditions as:
u
[1 p;0]
i = v
c[1 p;0]
i
since unrestricted dependence between v[1;T ]i ; 
c
i and those initial conditions will be allowed for.
We can rewrite the whole system as:
u
[1 p;T ]
i = M ()
[1 p;T ] ci + v
c[1 p;T ]
i
in which the matrix M ()[1 p;T ] is completed by p rows equal to zero, M ()[1 p;0] = 0.
We now go further and specify the correlation structure. A comment is in order. Usually,
the autoregressive structure directly applies to wage shocks uit and in the absence of covariates,
this is equivalent to specifying it through the residual part vcit because there is a single individual
e¤ect. This equivalence still holds when another heterogeneity factor interacted with a linear
trend is present. Nevertheless, our specication includes a third factor interacted with a geomet-
ric term and this breaks the equivalence. To circumvent this problem, we posit that vcit is a (time
heteroskedastic) ARMA process whose innovations are independent of the individual heterogen-
eity terms, ci . As a consequence, our variable of interest, uit, is the sum of two processes, the
S.ii
rst one being related to xed individual heterogeneity and the second one to the pure dynamic
process. These processes are assumed to be independent between them after period 1 although
they are both correlated with initial conditions, u[1 p;0]i .
We now derive the covariance matrix of u[1 p;T ]i as a function of the parameters of these
processes in two steps . We rst describe the ARMA process and then include the individual
heterogeneity factors.
S.II.1 Time heteroskedastic ARMA specication
Following Alvarez and Arellano (2004) or Guvenen (2009), we specify
vcit = 1v
c
it 1 + :::+ pv
c
it p + twit
where wit is MA(q):
wit =  it    1 it 1   :::   q it q:
Let  = (1; :; p) and MT () a matrix of size [T; T + p] where p = dim():
MT () =
0BBB@
 p :::  1 1 0 ::: 0
0  p :::  1 1 . . . ...
...
. . . . . .
...
. . . . . . 0
0 ::: 0  p :::  1 1
1CCCA :
If vc[1 p;T ]i =
 
vci1 p; :::; v
c
iT

, we have:  
Ip 0

MT ()

v
[1 p;T ]
i =
 
v
[1 p;0]
i
tw
[1;T ]
i
!
Since wit is MA (q), we have
w
[1;T ]
i = MT ( ):
[1 q;T ]
i
where  [1 q;T ]i = ( i1 q; :::;  iT ).
Denote  a diagonal matrix whose diagonal is (1; :; T ) to get the following description of
the stochastic process as a function of initial conditions and idiosyncratic errors:
Ip 0
MT ()

:v
c[1 p;T ]
i =

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )
 
v
c[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
: (S.II.1)
To compute the covariance of vc[1 p;T ]i , we derive the covariance matrix of

v
c[1 p;0]
i 
[1 q;T ]
i

.
Since  [1 q;T ]i are i.i.d and are of variance 1, the South-East corner of the matrix is the identity
matrix of size (1 + q + T ). The North West corner is assumed to be an unrestricted covariance
matrix V u[1 p;0]i =  00. Assuming as usual that E(ui it) = 0 for any  < t, we have that
E(v
c[1 p;0]
i :(
[1;T ]
i )
0) = 0: Only E(u[1 p;0]i :(
[1 q;0]
i )
0) remains to be dened:
E(v
c[1 p;0]
i :(
[1 q;0]
i )
0) = 
 = [!rs]
S.iii
where r 2 [1  p; 0] and s 2 [1  q; 0] and where:
r < s : !rs = 0
r  s : !rs is not constrained
because the innovation  is is drawn after r and is assumed to be not correlated with y
r
i .
Hence the covariance matrix of zi =
 
v
c[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
writes :

z = V
 
v
c[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
= V
0B@ v
c[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;0]
i

[1;T ]
i
1CA =
0@  00 
 0
0 Iq 0
0 0 IT
1A :
S.II.2 Individual heterogeneity
The covariance matrix of the individual heterogeneity factors is denoted . as said above,
we assume that the xed heterogeneity terms are independent of the whole innovation process

[1 q;T ]
i . As for the covariance structure between initial conditions and those factors, we assume
that:
E

v
c[1 p;0]
i 
c0
i

=  0
Consider the covariance matrix of initial conditions  :
 = V
0@ vc[1 p;0]i ci

[1 q;0]
i
1A =
0@  00  0 
 00  0

 0 Iq
1A :
and dene,
RT () =
  
Ip 0

MT ()
 1
ST;p( ;) =

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )

Write the covariance matrix of vector u[1 p;T ]i :

u = V

u
[1 p;T ]
i

= V

v
c[1 p;T ]
i +M ()
[1 p;T ] ci

= V
0@hM ()[1 p;T ] ; RT ():ST;p( ;)i
0@ civc[1 p;0]i

[1 q;T ]
i
1A1A
Since vc[1 p;T ]i = RT ():ST;p( ;)
 
v
c[1 p;0]
i

[1 q;T ]
i
!
, the matrix
V

v
c[1 p;T ]
i

= RT ():ST;p( ;):
z:ST;p( ;)
0RT ()0
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and
E

v
c[1 p;T ]
i 
0
i

M ()[1 p;T ]0 = RT ():ST;p( ;)E
 
v
c[1 p;0]
i (
c
i)
0

[1 q;T ]
i (
c
i)
0
!
M ()[1 p;T ]0
= RT ():ST;p( ;)

 0
0T+q;3

M ()[1 p;T ]0
= RT ():

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )

 0
0T+q;3

03;p;M ()
[1;T ]0

= RT ():

Ip 0p;T+q
0T;p :MT ( )

0p;p  0M ()
[1;T ]0
0T+q;p 0T+q;T

= RT ():

0p;p  0M ()
[1;T ]0
0T;p 0T;T

Hence,

u = RT ():ST;p( ;):
z:ST;p( ;)
0RT ()0 +M ()
[1 p;T ] M ()
[1 p;T ]0
+RT ():

0p;p  0M ()
[1;T ]0
0T;p 0T;T

+

0p;p 0p;T
M ()[1;T ]  00 0T;T

RT ()
0
The two rst terms correspond to variances of the dynamic process and the individual hetero-
geneity factors, the other terms correspond to the correlation between the two processes induced
by initial conditions. Note that the parameters of the MA process dont appear in the correla-
tion between the two processes since innovations are assumed to be independent with individual
heterogeneity factors. Initial conditions are given by  [1 q;0]i , 
c and vc[1 p;0]i .
The Choleski decomposition of matrix  can be parametrized expressing the following matrix
into a polar coordinate basis.0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 ::: ::: 0
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
.
.
. 0 1 0
. . .
::: 0 1 0 0
. . .
!12 1 0
0 !13 !
23
 1 0
.
.
. (1)1 q;1 p 1;1 p 2;1 p 3;1 p 1
0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. 2 p;2 p
. . . 1

(1)
0;0 1;0 21;0 3;0 :::
. . . 0;0 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
where (1)1 q;1 p = 0 if p > q and, more generally, 
(1)
l;m = 0 if l > m.
S.III Fixed E¤ect Estimation
The main equation is:
u
[1 p;T ]
i = M()
[1 p;T ]ci + v
c[1 p;T ]
i ;
where ci and v
c[1 p;T ]
i are centered by construction and where a row of M() is dened as
M()[t] = (1; t; 1=t) as in Appendix S.II (with some 0s between 1  p and 0).
S.v
Later on, we shall reintroduce the estimated averages, g, of the individual e¤ects that we
estimate by OLS using the sub-groups dened by age of entry and skill level (21 groups). Dene
the average in each group as y[1 p;T ]g and dene:
bg = (M()[1 p;T ]0M()[1 p;T ]) 1M()[1 p;T ]0y[1 p;T ]g :
We now present the xed e¤ect estimation of ci . We consider rst the case with no missing
values and extend it to the case with missing values.
Assume rst that there are no missing values. To deal with the correlation between ci and
vi, we can always write:
v
c[1 p;T ]
i = C
c
i + 
[1 p;T ]
i ;
where E((ci)
0[1 p;T ]i ) = 0 so that we get:
C = E(v
c[1 p;T ]
i (
c
i)
0)(E(ci(
c
i)
0)) 1;
and:

 = E(v
c[1 p;T ]
i v
c[1 p;T ]0
i )  E(vc[1 p;T ]i (ci)0)(E(ci(ci)0)) 1E(civc[1 p;T ]0i ):
This yields the estimating equation for ci :
u
[1 p;T ]
i = D
c
i + 
[1 p;T ]
i where D = M()
[1 p;T ] + C;
that we can estimate by GLS methods since D can be estimated using random e¤ect methods.
This yields:
~ci = Bu
[1 p;T ]
i ;
in which:
B = (D0
 1 D)
 1D0
 1 :
Furthermore:
~ci = B(D
c
i + 
[1 p;T ]
i ) = 
c
i +B
[1 p;T ]
i ;
is such that:
V (~ci) = EV (~
c
i j ci) + V E(~ci j ci)
=) V (~ci) = B
B0 + V ci .
The term B
B0 goes to zero at least at the rate 1=T since matrix D is determined by di¤erent
factors which are going to zero at least as fast as T 1:
The feasible estimator is now given by:
^ci = B^u
[1 p;T ]
i ;
S.vi
and by reinclusion of the estimated averages for each group, g3i = g; we have:
^i = g + ^
c
i = g + B^u
[1 p;T ]
i ;
Finally, the case with missing values is as follows. Suppose that u[1 p;T ]i is not observable,
only Siu
[1 p;T ]
i is where Si is the matrix of dimension (Ti; T + p+ 1) selecting non missing values
and where Ti is the number of such non missing values. Consequently,
~ci = BSiu
[1 p;T ]
i ;
and by analogy to results above, we have
^ci = B^iu
[1 p;T ]
i ;
in which B^i is a plug-in estimate of:
Bi = (D
0S 0i(Si
S
0
i)
 1SiD) 1D0S 0i(Si
S
0
i)
 1:
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Table S.iii: AIC criterion
ARMA(p,q) q=1 q=2 q=3
p=1 -344885 -344899 -344906
(43) (45) (47)
p=2 -345301 -345447 -345733
(47) (50) (53)
p=3 -345839 -346133 -346293
(51) (54) (58)
AIC criterion computed as -2log(L)+2K, with L the like-
lihood and K the number of parameters. Number of pa-
rameters in brackets.
S.x
Table S.iv: Estimated parameters of the Random Effects Model
1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-1 3-2 3-3
α1 .702 .729 .711 .263 .186 .220 .200 .203 .194
( .005) ( .006) ( .007) ( .011) ( .011) ( .011) (.012) ( .011) ( .011)
α2 .145 .324 .143 .191 .143 .161
( .004) ( .008) ( .009) ( .005) ( .009) (.009)
α3 .022 .087 .187
( .003) ( .004) ( .008)
ψ1 .369 .391 .373 - .091 - .172 - .135 - .164 - .166 - .189
( .005) ( .005) ( .007) ( .011) ( .011) ( .012) (.012) ( .011) ( .011)
ψ2 .020 .017 .170 - .028 - .046 - .046
( .003) ( .003) ( .006) ( .008) ( .008) (.008)
ψ3 - .012 - .080 .114
( .004) ( .004) ( .007)
ση1 .302 .302 .301 .310 .306 .304 .306 .300 .298
( .001) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) ( .003) (.003) ( .003) ( .004)
ση2 .038 .039 .039 .038 .039 .036 .038 .037 .037
( .005) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
ση3 .255 .259 .256 .263 .260 .248 .258 .247 .242
( .005) ( .006) ( .006) ( .004) ( .005) ( .005) (.005) ( .006) ( .007)
ρη1,η2 .473 .413 .454 .571 .486 .610 .505 .485 .365
( .016) ( .021) .021 ( .013) ( .017) ( .013) ( .017) ( .020) ( .030)
ρη1,η3 - .604 - .548 - .586 - .694 - .618 - .729 - .636 - .620 - .509
( .003) ( .020) .019 ( .011) ( .015) ( .012) ( .016) ( .019) ( .029)
ρη2,η3 - .946 - .948 - .947 - .945 - .946 - .941 - .946 - .943 - .944
( .023) ( .003) .003 ( .002) ( .002) ( .003) ( .002) ( .003) ( .004)
σy0 .491 .506 .496 .448 .479 .429 .442 .455 .494
( .000) ( .007) ( .007) ( .004) ( .005) ( .004) (.004) ( .005) ( .008)
σy−1 .381 .424 .359 .387 .386 .428
( .004) ( .005) ( .004) ( .004) ( .005) (.008)
σy−2 .264 .270 .299
( .004) ( .006) ( .008)
cov(η1, y0) - .227 - .257 - .237 - .156 - .214 - .149 -.186 - .201 - .282
( .019) ( .017) .017 ( .015) ( .016) ( .016) ( .016) ( .017) ( .019)
cov(η1, y−1) - .127 - .183 - .113 - .153 - .168 - .253
( .016) ( .017) ( .017) ( .017) ( .018) (.020)
cov(η1, y−2) - .169 - .185 - .267
( .018) ( .019) ( .022)
cov(η2, y0) .358 .402 .374 .232 .335 .155 .219 .253 .361
( .022) ( .020) .021 ( .017) ( .019) ( .021) ( .020) ( .022) ( .026)
cov(η2, y−1) .218 .331 .119 .242 .235 .352
( .019) ( .021) ( .024) ( .022) ( .025) (.029)
cov(η2, y−2) .239 .253 .351
( .024) ( .027) ( .032)
cov(η3, y0) - .290 - .333 - .305 - .179 - .270 - .107 - .163 - .195 - .291
( .018) ( .023) .023 ( .020) ( .022) ( .023) ( .023) ( .024) ( .029)
cov(η3, y−1) - .169 - .272 - .077 - .190 - .181 - .287
( .021) ( .023) ( .025) ( .023) ( .027) (.032)
cov(η3, y−2) - .181 - .194 - .282
( .026) ( .029) ( .035)
cov(y0, ζ0) .809 .036 - .024 - .823 .826 - .931 .841 - .795 .812
( .023) (8.525) 26.529 ( .269) ( .059) ( .207) (.061) ( .416) ( .096)
cov(y0, ζ−1) .779 - .012 .408 - .352 - .208 .361
( .438) 1.245 ( .102) (17.542) (152.666) (31.114)
cov(y−1, ζ−1) .798 .722 - .066 .830 .234
(.813) ( .062) ( .148) (41.955) (17.858)
cov(y0, ζ−2) - .805 - .719
(3.931) (76.705)
cov(y−1, ζ−2) - .382 - .202
(11.249) (44.061)
cov(y−2, ζ−2) .752
( .094)
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Table S.v: Yearly standard deviation of earnings
1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 3-1 3-2 3-3
1978 .311 .312 .312
( .001) ( .002) ( .002)
1979 .254 .257 .255 .222 .232 .219
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001)
1980 .223 .223 .223 .222 .227 .221 .224 .224 .230
( .005) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.002) ( .002) ( .002)
1981 .264 .260 .263 .000 .103 .002 .004 .006 .001
( .005) ( .005) ( .005) ( .096) ( .040) ( .066) (.082) ( .076) ( .060)
1982 .152 .150 .150 .194 .193 .197 .193 .195 .198
( .005) ( .005) ( .005) ( .002) ( .002) ( .002) (.002) ( .002) ( .002)
1983 .244 .243 .247 .040 .175 .096 .023 .039 .193
( .004) ( .005) ( .005) ( .063) ( .017) ( .037) (.048) ( .049) ( .021)
1984 .154 .149 .149 .189 .184 .187 .188 .188 .182
( .001) ( .004) ( .004) ( .002) ( .001) ( .002) (.001) ( .001) ( .002)
1985 .182 .182 .182 .181 .183 .183 .181 .183 .183
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1986 .187 .187 .187 .189 .189 .190 .190 .190 .192
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1987 .181 .182 .181 .176 .176 .177 .176 .177 .177
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1988 .180 .180 .181 .181 .181 .181 .181 .182 .183
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1989 .171 .172 .172 .168 .170 .169 .169 .170 .171
( .008) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1990 .012 .021 .005 .358 .303 .375 .349 .395 .363
( .002) ( .007) ( .008) ( .012) ( .008) ( .015) (.012) ( .016) ( .013)
1991 .182 .184 .180 .153 .167 .156 .161 .157 .163
( .001) ( .002) ( .002) ( .002) ( .001) ( .002) (.001) ( .002) ( .001)
1992 .162 .162 .162 .159 .155 .159 .157 .160 .161
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1993 .207 .207 .207 .209 .209 .209 .210 .209 .211
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1994 .237 .236 .237 .250 .250 .251 .252 .253 .254
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1995 .193 .195 .194 .177 .179 .177 .177 .178 .180
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1996 .177 .177 .177 .176 .178 .177 .177 .177 .178
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1997 .167 .167 .167 .162 .162 .162 .162 .162 .164
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1998 .137 .138 .138 .134 .137 .135 .135 .136 .138
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
1999 .152 .152 .152 .155 .157 .157 .156 .157 .158
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) (.000) ( .000) ( .001)
2000 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .160
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2001 .158 .158 .158 .159 .159 .160 .159 .160 .161
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2002 .153 .153 .153 .146 .146 .146 .146 .147 .149
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2003 .168 .167 .168 .178 .178 .179 .179 .180 .181
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2004 .147 .148 .148 .133 .133 .134 .133 .134 .135
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2005 .128 .128 .128 .130 .132 .130 .131 .131 .133
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
2006 .123 .124 .123 .124 .124 .124 .125 .125 .127
( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .000) ( .000) ( .000) (.000) ( .000) ( .000)
2007 .117 .117 .117 .115 .116 .116 .115 .117 .118
( .003) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) ( .001) (.001) ( .001) ( .001)
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Table S.vi: Raw covariance matrix by number of non-missing periods
Sample periods V ar(η1) Cov(η1, η2) Cov(η1, η3) V ar(η2) Cov(η2, η3) V ar(η3)
4 4.7 0.41 -5.5 0.16 -1.1 9.4
(889) (68) (956) (5.3) (74) (1029)
5 23 0.8 -20 0.1 -1.1 19
(101) (7.6) (108) (0.59) (8.2) (115)
6 21 1.5 -22 0.15 -1.8 24
(45) (3.3) (48) (0.25) (3.6) (51)
7 18 1.3 -18 0.13 -1.5 20
(36) (2.8) (39) (0.21) (3) (42)
8 20 1.6 -21 0.15 -1.8 24
(27) (2.3) (30) (0.19) (2.5) (33)
9 16 1.3 -17 0.12 -1.5 19
(14) (1.2) (16) (0.11) (1.4) (18)
10 15 1.4 -17 0.14 -1.6 20
(9.8) (0.88) (11) (0.081) (1) (13)
11 9.4 0.86 -11 0.087 -1 12
(5.1) (0.47) (5.9) (0.044) (0.54) (6.8)
12 5.6 0.52 -6.3 0.055 -0.63 7.4
(2.6) (0.25) (3) (0.025) (0.29) (3.5)
13 3.9 0.37 -4.4 0.039 -0.44 5.1
(1.3) (0.13) (1.5) (0.013) (0.15) (1.8)
14 2.9 0.33 -3.6 0.041 -0.43 4.5
(0.86) (0.1) (1.1) (0.012) (0.13) (1.4)
15 2.4 0.25 -2.8 0.03 -0.32 3.4
(0.72) (0.075) (0.86) (0.0081) (0.091) (1)
16 0.93 0.1 -1.1 0.016 -0.15 1.5
(0.24) (0.026) (0.29) (0.0032) (0.033) (0.36)
17 1.1 0.12 -1.3 0.019 -0.18 1.7
(0.26) (0.032) (0.33) (0.0043) (0.043) (0.44)
18 0.75 0.089 -0.9 0.014 -0.13 1.2
(0.17) (0.021) (0.22) (0.0029) (0.029) (0.3)
19 0.53 0.064 -0.61 0.012 -0.1 0.91
(0.085) (0.012) (0.11) (0.0018) (0.017) (0.16)
20 0.33 0.04 -0.37 0.0084 -0.069 0.59
(0.04) (0.0056) (0.052) (0.001) (0.0088) (0.077)
21 0.22 0.017 -0.17 0.0051 -0.039 0.32
(0.029) (0.0032) (0.03) (0.00062) (0.005) (0.044)
22 0.17 0.018 -0.16 0.0048 -0.037 0.3
(0.019) (0.0031) (0.026) (0.00068) (0.0053) (0.042)
23 0.18 0.014 -0.13 0.0047 -0.033 0.25
(0.017) (0.0024) (0.019) (0.00051) (0.0038) (0.03)
24 0.16 0.015 -0.13 0.0049 -0.036 0.28
(0.017) (0.0027) (0.022) (0.00061) (0.0047) (0.037)
25 0.14 0.011 -0.098 0.0035 -0.025 0.19
(0.014) (0.0023) (0.019) (0.00042) (0.0033) (0.027)
26 0.1 0.0071 -0.064 0.003 -0.02 0.15
(0.0072) (0.00093) (0.0071) (0.00023) (0.0016) (0.012)
27 0.082 0.0048 -0.043 0.0021 -0.014 0.099
(0.0046) (0.00063) (0.0047) (0.00015) (0.001) (0.0072)
28 0.071 0.0037 -0.033 0.0018 -0.012 0.081
(0.0049) (0.00067) (0.0047) (0.00016) (0.0011) (0.0073)
Complete sample 2.6 0.22 -2.8 0.024 -0.27 3.3
(3.4) (0.27) (3.7) (0.022) (0.29) (4)
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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Table S.vii: Bias corrected covariance matrix by number of sampling periods
Sample periods V ar(η1) Cov(η1, η2) Cov(η1, η3) V ar(η2) Cov(η2, η3) V ar(η3)
4 -22 -1.7 23 -0.0065 1.2 -22
(744) (56) (796) (4.3) (60) (852)
5 5.9 -0.54 -1.5 -0.0091 0.42 -0.98
(69) (5.2) (73) (0.4) (5.6) (78)
6 6.6 0.48 -6.9 0.064 -0.62 7.7
(23) (1.7) (24) (0.13) (1.8) (26)
7 3.9 0.14 -3.3 0.029 -0.23 3.3
(23) (1.7) (24) (0.13) (1.8) (26)
8 4.4 0.29 -4.4 0.034 -0.36 4.8
(16) (1.3) (18) (0.11) (1.5) (19)
9 4.1 0.29 -4.3 0.027 -0.33 4.6
(8) (0.69) (8.9) (0.061) (0.77) (9.9)
10 6.2 0.54 -6.9 0.054 -0.64 8
(6.4) (0.57) (7.3) (0.052) (0.65) (8.2)
11 4.2 0.35 -4.5 0.035 -0.41 5.2
(3.7) (0.33) (4.2) (0.03) (0.38) (4.7)
12 3.3 0.28 -3.6 0.027 -0.32 4
(2.3) (0.21) (2.6) (0.02) (0.24) (3)
13 1.6 0.11 -1.5 0.0089 -0.11 1.5
(1.5) (0.15) (1.8) (0.016) (0.18) (2.1)
14 1.7 0.18 -2 0.023 -0.24 2.5
(0.76) (0.088) (0.95) (0.011) (0.11) (1.2)
15 1.7 0.16 -1.9 0.019 -0.2 2.3
(0.65) (0.065) (0.76) (0.0068) (0.077) (0.89)
16 0.73 0.076 -0.81 0.011 -0.11 1.1
(0.25) (0.026) (0.29) (0.0031) (0.033) (0.35)
17 0.89 0.1 -1 0.015 -0.14 1.4
(0.26) (0.032) (0.33) (0.0042) (0.042) (0.43)
18 0.62 0.071 -0.72 0.01 -0.097 0.96
(0.17) (0.021) (0.22) (0.0028) (0.028) (0.29)
19 0.45 0.052 -0.49 0.0089 -0.077 0.7
(0.085) (0.012) (0.11) (0.0018) (0.017) (0.16)
20 0.27 0.032 -0.29 0.0062 -0.051 0.43
(0.04) (0.0057) (0.052) (0.001) (0.0087) (0.077)
21 0.18 0.012 -0.13 0.0034 -0.026 0.22
(0.029) (0.0032) (0.03) (0.00061) (0.0049) (0.043)
22 0.15 0.015 -0.13 0.0035 -0.027 0.22
(0.019) (0.0031) (0.026) (0.00067) (0.0053) (0.042)
23 0.16 0.012 -0.11 0.0035 -0.024 0.19
(0.017) (0.0024) (0.02) (5e-04) (0.0038) (0.03)
24 0.14 0.014 -0.12 0.0041 -0.03 0.23
(0.017) (0.0027) (0.022) (0.00061) (0.0047) (0.037)
25 0.13 0.01 -0.089 0.0028 -0.02 0.16
(0.014) (0.0023) (0.019) (0.00041) (0.0033) (0.027)
26 0.097 0.0066 -0.059 0.0025 -0.017 0.12
(0.0072) (0.00093) (0.0072) (0.00023) (0.0016) (0.012)
27 0.077 0.0046 -0.04 0.0017 -0.011 0.079
(0.0046) (0.00064) (0.0047) (0.00015) (0.001) (0.0074)
28 0.067 0.0036 -0.031 0.0015 -0.0097 0.067
(0.0049) (0.00067) (0.0047) (0.00016) (0.0011) (0.0074)
Complete sample 0.96 0.07 -0.95 0.0096 -0.094 1.1
(2) (0.16) (2.1) (0.013) (0.17) (2.3)
Random effects 0.093 0.0059 -0.05 0.0015 -0.0093 0.066
(0.0036) (0.00051) (0.004) (0.00011) (0.00079) (0.0059)
Note: Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses.
S.xiv
Table S.viii: Counterfactual variances by skills
Years
η1 = η¯1g
η2 = η¯2g
η3 = η¯3g
Heterogeneity
in: Levels Growth Curvature
Growth
and
Curvature
All
Log-wage 1977 0.279 0.284 0.28 0.281 0.283 0.284
(0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00691) (0.00703) (0.00714)
Log-wage 1982 0.00486 0.0373 0.00809 0.0124 0.0227 0.0394
(0.00771) (0.00771) (0.00771) (0.00771) (0.00781) (0.00791)
Log-wage 1987 0.00569 0.0428 0.0173 0.0192 0.0195 0.0468
(0.00945) (0.00945) (0.00945) (0.00945) (0.00953) (0.00961)
Log-wage 1992 0.00641 0.0439 0.0324 0.029 0.0328 0.0639
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0128)
Log-wage 1997 0.00685 0.0444 0.0531 0.0446 0.0555 0.0808
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0182)
Log-wage 2002 0.00684 0.0444 0.0791 0.07 0.08 0.091
(0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0264)
Log-wage 2007 0.00627 0.0438 0.11 0.112 0.113 0.113
(0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.0389) (0.039)
Long-run 0.013 0.0421 0.0283 0.0299 0.0299 0.0458
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Note: Low skills. Only observations with more than 21 periods. 2942 observations.
Years
η1 = η¯1g
η2 = η¯2g
η3 = η¯3g
Heterogeneity
in: Levels Growth Curvature
Growth
and
Curvature
All
Log-wage 1977 0.00935 0.0172 0.0103 0.0116 0.0144 0.0176
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0164)
Log-wage 1982 0.014 0.0716 0.0189 0.0256 0.0391 0.0728
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0181)
Log-wage 1987 0.0173 0.0832 0.0349 0.0381 0.0384 0.0913
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0201)
Log-wage 1992 0.0207 0.0872 0.0601 0.0555 0.0602 0.121
(0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0224)
Log-wage 1997 0.0239 0.0905 0.0939 0.0821 0.0959 0.149
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.025) (0.0251)
Log-wage 2002 0.0268 0.0933 0.136 0.124 0.137 0.167
(0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0284)
Log-wage 2007 0.029 0.0956 0.187 0.191 0.193 0.197
(0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0324)
Long-run value 0.017 0.0686 0.0403 0.043 0.043 0.0766
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0201) (0.0203)
Note: Medium skills. Only observations with more than 21 periods. 1433 observations.
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Figure S.i: Change over time in mean and variance of log earnings for cohorts 1977-2000
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Figure S.ii: First order autocorrelation relative to potential experience for 1977, 1987 and 1997
entry cohorts
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Figure S.iii: Unconstrained estimates: variance of residuals vit by age and skill group
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